نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استادیار گروه حقوق جزا و جرمشناسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
2 دانشجوی دکترای حقوق جزا و جرمشناسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Corporations often defend against criminal accusations by asserting that the wrongful actions of their representatives were arbitrary and contrary to the company’s established policies. They claim that despite implementing all reasonable preventative measures, the representative's criminal conduct violated the corporation's internal regulations. This raises a pivotal issue for judicial authorities, that is, whether these preventative measures influence corporate criminal responsibility if the corporation's claim is valid. This research, employing a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, seeks to elucidate and analyze this issue. The findings reveal diverse approaches across different legal systems. While some legal systems recognize the significance of these measures, others do not address them, resulting in ambiguous interpretations. The study identifies four main legal consequences of establishing such measures: negation of vicarious (responsibility) liability, avoidance of criminal responsibility, mitigation of punishment, and the potential for agreements to suspend prosecution of corporations. An analysis of Iran's legal system suggests that, despite legal ambiguities, effective corporate monitoring and control over representatives' behavior can mitigate corporate punishment or persuade prosecutors to issue an agreement to suspend prosecution.
کلیدواژهها [English]
الف) فارسی
ب) انگلیسی