This article presents a comparative doctrinal analysis of the offence of baghy (armed rebellion) as applied in Safavid Iran and as codified in the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 (1392 AH-Sh). Using a descriptive–analytical method and drawing on authoritative Safavid chronicles—‘Alam-ārā-ye ‘Abbāsi, Rawżat al-Ṣafaviyya, Aḥsan al-Tavārīkh, Jahāngoshā-ye Khāqān—alongside the 2013 Code, the study examines the constituent elements of baghy, the legal status of bāghiyān, the historical trajectory of the concept, and its function as a mechanism for safeguarding political authority and public order.

The principal research question concerns the extent to which the substantive and procedural dimensions of baghy in these two periods conform to the doctrinal parameters of Imamie jurisprudence or reflect historical and political adaptations. The findings indicate that in Safavid Iran, baghy functioned primarily as a political–legal designation for armed or organized opposition to the sovereign, serving as a doctrinally cloaked justification for coercive state action. Safavid historians routinely employed legal–juristic terminology such as bāghy and ṭāghī to classify political adversaries, thereby retroactively legitimizing punitive measures under the rubric of preserving public order and suppressing sedition.

In contrast, the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 formally situates baghy within the statutory framework of offences against internal security, adopting a definition broadly consonant with its jurisprudential roots while integrating modern legislative considerations. Although the requirement of organized armed action remains consistent with classical doctrine, the penalty structure, gradation of culpability, and procedural mechanisms governing prosecution exhibit notable statutory evolution.