Factual ignorance and criminal responsibility according to virtue ethics theory

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

2 Ph.D. Student of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

10.22059/jqclcs.2024.364561.1869

Abstract

The virtue ethics theory emphasizes various factors such as moral traits and the role of motives in the actions of a moral agent, which are assessed based on the agent's character and analysis of his regret. This theory offers a distinct interpretation of ignorance and introduces a novel perspective on the criteria for assigning blame to behaviors stemming from ignorance. Consequently, this theory suggests the appropriate treatment of individuals who act out of ignorance.
 Employing a descriptive-analytical approach, this article seeks to ascertain the appropriate response to individuals who act out of ignorance and examines the role of regret and vices of character in determining criminal responsibility from the standpoint of virtue ethics.
Based on the research findings, actions resulting from ignorance of particulars are deemed involuntary. When an ignorant individual is not responsible for his ignorance and regrets his inappropriate behavior, he cannot be held criminally responsible. However, if the individual lacks remorse despite his ignorance, he may not be culpable for his lack of knowledge but may still incur anger and resentment. Legally, this resentment can manifest in the form of security measures. When an individual is responsible for his ignorance, he can be blamed for his lack of knowledge, although the actions resulting from his ignorance are not morally blameworthy. Nevertheless, given the significance of social considerations in criminal responsibility, these actions may be subject to reproach based on the requirements of criminal justice, particularly if the individual does not express regret for committing the crime.

Keywords

References

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