Plea Bargaining in Common Law and Similar Institutions in Criminal Procedure of Iran

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant professor of Shahr-e-Kord University

Abstract

Committing crimes as acting violate public order, cause public response in all societies and as soon as its detection, prosecutor as a representative of the public interest starts to prosecute the accused. In the meantime sometimes in criminal procedure of different countries, for protect some interests such as prevention of inflation of criminal cases, prevention of damages from prison to the perpetrators of minor crimes, satisfaction of victims, allocation resources of the criminal justice system to the serious crimes and Professional perpetrators and ..., create institutions that generate the discretion for prosecutor in the criminal prosecution. In common law, plea bargaining is a clear example of this expediency.The legislative history of our country indicates that criminal legislators exhibit tendency to respect interest in criminal procedure with providing suspension of prosecution. This approach in the new Code of Criminal Procedure Act, adopted in 2014with providing institutions like closing the case and suspension of prosecution is strengthened. Although, these institutions are differences to Anglo- American plea bargaining, in some ways, as the purpose and effect have similarities.

Highlights

No

Keywords


ندارد

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