Criminal law and Criminology Studies

Abstract Abstract
The military operations conducted by the United States and Israel against certain Iranian universities, educational institutions, and research centers have generated significant legal debate concerning the status of such facilities under international humanitarian law. These attacks have raised fundamental questions regarding the legal protection afforded to universities and research institutions during armed conflicts, the circumstances under which they may lawfully become military objectives, and the extent to which international humanitarian law permits attacks against them.
International humanitarian law is founded upon the principle of distinction, which requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives. Educational institutions, universities, and civilian research centers are generally regarded as civilian objects and therefore enjoy protection against attack unless and for such time as they become military objectives in accordance with the criteria established by international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the practical application of these principles is often complicated by the evolving nature of modern warfare, particularly where civilian infrastructure performs functions that may indirectly or directly contribute to military capabilities.
This article seeks to examine the legal status of universities and educational and research centers under international humanitarian law by addressing the following principal research question: Under what circumstances may universities and research institutions lawfully lose their civilian protection and become legitimate military objectives? In answering this question, the article also considers whether recent attacks against Iranian universities and research facilities can be justified under the applicable rules of international humanitarian law or whether they constitute violations of the legal protections afforded to civilian infrastructure.
The study employs a doctrinal legal research methodology based upon the systematic analysis of international treaties, customary international humanitarian law and relevant soft-law instruments.
The findings demonstrate that, from the perspective of international humanitarian law, universities and educational and research centers may be classified into two broad legal categories. The first category consists of military educational institutions, including military academies, officer training universities, defense colleges, and research centers that are organizationally integrated into the armed forces of a State. Because these institutions are established primarily to support military operations, train military personnel, or directly contribute to national defense capabilities, they are military objectives by their very nature and are governed by the rules applicable to military installations under international humanitarian law.
The second category comprises civilian universities, public and private educational institutions, scientific laboratories, and civilian research centers that are not organizationally affiliated with the armed forces. As a general rule, these institutions constitute civilian objects and therefore benefit from protection against military attack. Their destruction cannot be justified merely because weakening a State’s educational, scientific, or technological capacity may indirectly diminish its long-term national strength. Rather, the protection of such institutions reflects the broader objective of international humanitarian law to preserve civilian life and civilian infrastructure during armed conflict and to minimize unnecessary human suffering.
Although neither the Hague Conventions nor the Geneva Conventions expressly identify universities and research institutions as a distinct protected category, their protection is derived from the general principles governing civilian objects, particularly the principles of distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and precaution. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions further reinforces these protections by prohibiting attacks directed against civilian objects unless they effectively contribute to military operation and their destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage under the circumstances prevailing at the time of the attack. Furthermore, a growing body of soft-law instruments developed specifically to safeguard education during armed conflict strengthens the normative expectation that educational institutions should remain protected from the effects of hostilities whenever possible.
The study further concludes that maintaining the civilian character of universities and research institutions is not solely the responsibility of the attacking party; States exercising control over such facilities also bear important obligations under international humanitarian law to preserve their protected status and reduce the risk of incidental harm, they should refrain, as far as practicable, from locating military installations, deploying military personnel, storing weapons, or conducting military operations within or in the immediate vicinity of universities and civilian research centers. The deliberate use of civilian educational facilities to shield military assets or military activities may compromise their protected status and expose them to lawful attack under the rules governing military objectives.
Accordingly, this article concludes that the legal status of universities and educational and research institutions under international humanitarian law depends not upon their formal designation but upon their actual functions and contribution to military operations. Civilian universities enjoy comprehensive legal protection against attack unless they lose that protection by becoming military objectives under the strict criteria established by international humanitarian law. Any interpretation that broadly permits attacks against educational institutions solely because of their scientific activities, technological capabilities, or potential future contribution to national development would undermine the humanitarian objectives of the law of armed conflict and significantly weaken the protection afforded to civilian infrastructure.
Keywords: Universities and Educational-Research Centers, Military Objectives, Principle of Precaution, Principle of Distinction, Principle of Proportionality, Military Advantage.

Abstract Introduction and Objective:
Domestic violence cases present a distinctive evidentiary and procedural difficulty because the victim is frequently also the principal, and sometimes the only, witness to the offence. Unlike many ordinary crimes, domestic violence often occurs in private, within an ongoing intimate or familial relationship, and in circumstances marked by emotional, economic, or social dependence. Requiring the victim-witness to testify in the direct physical presence of the accused may therefore intensify fear, psychological pressure, secondary victimization, and the risk of retaliation. At the same time, restricting direct confrontation may affect the defendant’s right to know, examine, and challenge incriminating evidence. The central question is thus whether the defendant’s confrontation right necessarily requires face-to-face physical encounter or whether its manner of exercise may be modified while its essential defensive function is preserved.
The comparison between Iran and Saudi Arabia is particularly relevant because both legal systems have adopted general frameworks for protecting witnesses and other persons exposed to danger during criminal proceedings. In Iran, Note 1 to Article 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the 2015 Executive Regulation on the Protection of Witnesses and Informants provide measures such as preventing direct confrontation, concealing identity, remote testimony, and security protection. Saudi Arabia enacted the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, Witnesses, Experts, and Victims in 2024 and issued its Executive Regulation in 2026. Although the two frameworks differ in legislative status and personal scope, they perform comparable functions and can therefore be assessed against international standards concerning victim protection, fair trial guarantees, necessity, proportionality, and individualized risk assessment.
Methodology:
This study employs a descriptive-analytical and comparative method. It first examines the conceptual content of the right of confrontation and distinguishes direct physical confrontation from the broader right to obtain sufficient knowledge of testimonial evidence and to challenge its credibility and reliability. It then analyzes relevant international instruments, including the United Nations Updated Model Strategies and Practical Measures, the Istanbul Convention, and CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35. Finally, the study compares Iranian and Saudi legislation regarding the persons entitled to protection, alternatives to direct confrontation, confidentiality of identity, remote testimony, risk assessment, continuity of protection, and compensatory safeguards for the defence.
Findings and Analysis:
International standards do not treat physical confrontation as an absolute requirement in every case. They permit protective arrangements where direct encounter creates a serious risk of intimidation, retaliation, psychological harm, or secondary victimization. Measures such as separate testimony rooms, audiovisual communication, intermediated questioning, restricted contact with the accused, confidentiality, and protection orders may therefore be justified. Nevertheless, such restrictions must be based on necessity and proportionality, tailored to the circumstances of the individual case, and accompanied by safeguards enabling the defendant to understand the substance of the evidence and challenge it effectively. The decisive distinction is therefore between the physical form of confrontation and its procedural function.
Iranian law recognizes several alternatives to face-to-face testimony. The Executive Regulation permits remote testimony, separate hearing arrangements, concealment of identity and personal information, and physical or residential protection. These mechanisms can be useful in domestic violence cases, especially where the victim-witness fears the accused or remains connected to him through residence, children, or financial dependence. However, the Iranian framework is primarily witness-oriented. A woman subjected to domestic violence is not independently protected merely because she is a victim with a particular vulnerability; she generally benefits from the Regulation only when she qualifies as a witness or informant and when the judicial authority identifies a relevant danger. This is a significant limitation because, in domestic violence cases, the witness is often the victim herself. The law does not expressly treat the continuing intimate relationship, prior patterns of abuse, dependence, child-related concerns, or the likelihood of post-trial retaliation as independent criteria of risk. Moreover, the evidentiary weight of anonymous testimony and the compensatory safeguards required where the defence cannot examine the witness directly remain insufficiently clarified.
Saudi law provides a broader personal and institutional framework. Article 1 of the 2024 Law expressly includes the “victim” alongside whistleblowers, witnesses, and experts and extends protection to spouses, relatives, and other closely connected persons exposed to danger. Article 2 requires competent authorities, where appropriate, to conceal identifying information. Article 3 authorizes remote testimony, alteration of voice and image, prevention of visual contact, and hearing testimony separately from the accused and counsel. It also provides a limited mechanism for disclosure where identity is necessary for the exercise of the right of defence and the testimony constitutes the sole evidence. Articles 7 to 10 regulate admission to the protection programme, while Article 9 requires consideration of the nature of the danger, gravity of the offence, psychological condition, adaptability, and available alternatives. Article 14 provides security, legal, psychological, social, residential, occupational, and financial protection. The 2026 Executive Regulation further emphasizes continuous risk assessment, modification or continuation of protective measures, and extension of protection to closely connected persons where necessary.
Despite these advantages, the Saudi framework was not designed specifically for domestic violence and is limited to serious arrestable offences. Consequently, some recurrent but legally less severe forms of domestic abuse may remain outside its scope. In addition, merely informing the accused or counsel of the substance of testimony does not invariably satisfy the right of defence unless a practical opportunity exists to submit questions and contest credibility.
Conclusion:
The study concludes that modifying direct confrontation in domestic violence cases is not inherently inconsistent with a fair trial. The essential content of confrontation lies in effective knowledge, questioning, and challenge rather than compulsory physical encounter. Saudi law offers a more victim-oriented framework than Iranian law because it expressly recognizes victims and provides broader, continuing, and multidimensional protection. Iranian law nevertheless contains important procedural tools but should expressly include domestic violence victims, adopt individualized and continuing risk assessment, clarify the evidentiary status of protected testimony, and require effective compensatory safeguards. In both systems, the preferable model is one that prevents harmful face-to-face confrontation while preserving the defendant’s genuine ability to test the evidence.

Abstract Terrorist attacks against military targets and armed forces in international law


Short Abstract

International terrorist groups have become stronger than before. Nowadays, they can not only plan and implement terrorist attacks to public properties but also dare to threat and attack military targets including military facilities and armed forces. Furthermore, both acts of aggression by the US and Israel against Iran in 2025 and 2026—which led to the ‘12-Day War’ and the ‘Ramadan War’—began with the widespread assassination of Iranian military commanders. This is while the traditional definition of terrorism defines this violence as attacks on civilians, public and government facilities to create a climate of intimidation and terror in society. So, targeting military objects raises some important questions on the legal description of the attack and its applicable law, respectively. This article seeks to answer whether an attack by a terrorist group against military facilities and armed forces of a State is a terrorist attack and, if so, how the anti-terrorism law should be applied in confronting it. The author hypothesizes that attacks against military facilities and armed forces are deemed terrorist attacks in situations where they would not have been taking part actively in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict.

Extended English Abstract
International terrorist groups have become stronger than before. Nowadays, they can not only plan and implement terrorist attacks to public properties but also dare to threat and attack military targets including military facilities and armed forces. Furthermore, both acts of aggression by the US and Israel against Iran in 2025 and 2026—which led to the ‘12-Day War’ and the ‘Ramadan War’—began with the widespread assassination of Iranian military commanders. This is while the traditional definition of terrorism defines this violence as attacks on civilians and public and government facilities in order to create a climate of intimidation and terror in society. Therefore, when terrorist groups attack a military target or armed forces, important questions arise regarding the legal description of the attack and, consequently, the applicable laws to counter it. The main question is when a purely military target or armed forces are targeted by terrorist groups with political motives, can the attack be considered a terrorist attack and consequently, applied international rights and obligations regarding counter-terrorism to that attack and its perpetrators?
In response to this question, this article attempts to prove the hypothesis that attacks on military targets and armed forces during times other than armed conflicts are considered terrorist acts and that counter-terrorism laws, including anti-terrorism conventions, are applicable to them.
The article concludes by using the library collection method of its sources and the systematic analysis research method to prove its hypothesis: A significant number of international counter-terrorism conventions were adopted at a time when most terrorist acts were individual. Individual terrorism, while dangerous, is not capable of threatening military objectives. For this very reason, until the last decade of the 20th century, governments and international and regional organizations did not consider attacks against military targets and armed forces as terrorist and excluded them from international and regional anti-terrorism instruments. The growth of religious extremism, along with the communications revolution, has provided the basis for the emergence and growth of transnational and organized terrorism. Unlike individual terrorism, this type of terrorism has the ability to attack military targets and armed forces. Military sites and armed forces who are not engaged in active hostilities are in practice no different from public places and civilians, and at the same time they are a tempting target for a terrorist group to demonstrate its power and legitimize. In such circumstances, the exclusion of attacks against military targets and military personnel from the definition of terrorism and inclusion of the counter-terrorism instruments would be a gift to terrorist groups. The legal rule must follow and regulate the legal reality, otherwise, the law will remain abandoned.
A review of developments in counter-terrorism documents indicates that the legal rule is moving in the aforementioned direction: the counter-terrorism conventions adopted in the late 2000s have extended their provisions to attacks against military targets and armed forces, provided that the targets or armed forces being attacked are not engaged in an active armed conflict. The latter condition is important from two perspectives. First, the interference of different legal regimes must be avoided: the application of counter-terrorism law during armed conflicts, where humanitarian law is applicable, would create serious problems in determining the rights and obligations of the parties to the conflict. Second, the meaning and application of the phrase “period of armed conflict” is problematic. Because there are situations during armed conflicts that, although covered by international humanitarian law, do not necessarily constitute an armed conflict in the strict sense of the word, care must be taken to ensure that the application of counter-terrorism law does not weaken the parties to the conflict, particularly the people fighting against occupation.


Keywords: terrorism, military targets, military personnel, armed conflict periods, humanitarian law.

Abstract A) Introduction
In recent decades, the rapid proliferation of virtual platforms and social networks has fundamentally transformed the landscape of crime and deviance. Platform-based cyber criminal activities — that is, crimes and deviations that exploit digital platforms as instruments or environments for their commission — are increasing not only in volume and variety, but also differ substantially from traditional offenses in terms of structure, actors, and social consequences. These crimes transcend geographical boundaries, create complex causal chains among platforms, users, and victims, and frequently occupy the grey zone between crime, deviance, and commercial conduct. The transnational nature of these offenses and the multi-layered structure of host platforms have created serious challenges for jurisdictional authority, criminal attribution, and the enforcement of judicial decisions. What further complicates this challenge is the economic power and political influence of transnational platform corporations, which frequently contest the capacity of national governments to exercise judicial sovereignty. Despite this, criminal policy scholarship has predominantly focused on the technical and criminological dimensions of this phenomenon, neglecting the ideological-structural analysis of criminal policy models in response to it. This theoretical neglect assumes particular significance at a time when major ideological shifts from neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism are underway and states are searching for new strategies to regulate the digital space, thereby reinforcing the necessity and urgency of the present study.
B) Research Objectives
The primary objective of this study is to analyze and compare the criminal policy characteristics of four liberal paradigms —classical liberalism, modern liberalism, neoliberalism, and post-neoliberalism— in response to platform-based virtual criminal activities. The study seeks to demonstrate what approach each of these ideologies adopts with respect to crime prevention, criminalization, punitive and non-punitive responses, the role of the state and society, and the treatment of deviance in the virtual platform environment. Furthermore, the study aims to show how the distinct philosophical foundations of these ideologies —from the primacy of individual liberty in classical liberalism to the emphasis on distributive justice in post-neoliberalism— lead to divergent and at times contradictory policy strategies. The secondary objective is to identify points of convergence and divergence among these approaches and to critically evaluate each paradigm's capacity to address the complexities of this domain, thereby laying the groundwork for constructive dialogue among competing models and facilitating the development of more effective criminal policy frameworks.
C) Research Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative approach and employs a descriptive-analytical method. Data were collected through a systematic review of library sources, including books, peer-reviewed articles, legal documents, and authoritative policy reports in the fields of criminal policy, criminology, and political theory. The analytical framework was designed around six comparative axes: crime prevention and non-punitive responses, criminalization and punitive responses, communal responses, state responses, responses to crime, and responses to deviance. These axes were developed drawing on comparative criminal policy literature and enable the systematic measurement of ideological differences at the level of operational strategies. Each paradigm was first analyzed independently on the basis of primary theoretical sources, and similarities and differences among them were subsequently extracted through structured comparative analysis.
D) Research Findings
The findings reveal that classical liberalism, grounded in the principle of minimal state intervention, restricts criminalization to overt violations of individual rights, situates prevention within the sphere of individual responsibility, and regards punishment as an instrument of rational deterrence. Within this paradigm, deviant behavior in virtual platform spaces is treated as a private matter, the state assumes a minimal regulatory role, and the responsibility for protecting users rests essentially with the users themselves. Modern liberalism, accepting a more active role for the welfare state, prioritizes social prevention, balances criminalization with guarantees of fundamental user rights, and favors rehabilitative and restorative responses over purely retributive punishment; within this framework, platforms are obligated to comply with human rights standards and remain accountable to public institutions, and democratic oversight of their conduct is regarded as essential. Neoliberalism subordinates criminal policy to the logic of economic efficiency, favors platform self-regulation, regards punitive mechanisms as amenable to private-sector outsourcing, and substitutes situational prevention through market mechanisms for direct state intervention; the consequence of this approach is the transfer of regulatory power from public institutions to technology corporations and, as a result, the weakening of democratic accountability. Post-neoliberalism, by contrast, treats digital territorial sovereignty as a foundational principle, deems the criminalization of structural platform abuses essential, rejects the privatization of criminal justice as an undermining of the rule of law, and places victim compensation alongside punishment at the center of its policy agenda; this approach also places particular emphasis on the participation of affected groups in criminal policy-making processes.
E) Conclusion
The comparative analysis of the four liberal paradigms demonstrates that, despite sharing common liberal foundations, these approaches offer distinct and at times contradictory strategies for addressing platform-based cybercrimes. None of these models is free from structural weaknesses: classical liberalism lacks adequate regulatory instruments; neoliberalism reduces justice to a commodity; modern liberalism grapples with unresolved tensions between liberty and digital security; and post-neoliberalism risks sliding toward digital authoritarianism under the guise of territorial sovereignty. These structural contradictions reveal that platform-based cybercrimes constitute a phenomenon that exceeds the analytical capacity of any single ideology and requires an intersubjective and multidimensional approach. Accordingly, designing an effective criminal policy in response to these offenses requires moving beyond ideologically pure frameworks, drawing on the strengths of each approach, and engaging in critical and constructive dialogue among these competing models.

Abstract In the late 1980s, criminology became so entrenched in extreme truth-seeking, theoretical crisis, and the endless competition of theories that it required a dramatic transformation to survive. To solve this problem, criminologists, distancing themselves from modern paradigms, have opened their arms to perspectives that seek the future of criminology in the reconciliation of theories without theoretical competition and extreme simplification. Thus, integrative criminology was born. One of the strategies through which integrative criminology seeks to make criminological theories more profitable is the combination of criminological theories, which is referred to as an integrated theory approach. Despite some criticism, this approach was gradually adopted, and integrated theories were born one after another. However, like other criminological theories, most of the integrated theories in the field of street crime were made, and the integrated analysis of different types of white-collar crimes was ignored. One of the white-collar crimes that suffers from the lack of integrated theory is the violation of fundamental human rights by the governmental organization, which is called state crimes. The characteristics of these crimes, such as being organizational, complex, and related to the power structure, are such that they cannot be explained in just one dimension. Thus, there is no choice but to integrate different theories to explain the state crimes. To achieve this goal, we can use some mainstream criminology theories, such as opportunity, labeling, control theories, neutralization and anomie techniques, as well as critical theories, like Marxist and Structural criminology. Accordingly, by integrating the main propositions of these theories, one can explain state crimes in the form of an opportunistic process. The proposed theory focuses primarily on structural factors affecting the state crime. These factors include the political structure (with totalitarian and authoritarian rule), the ideology of the ruling class (supremacy arising from nationality, religion, class) and the economic structure (command or Free Market Economy) that provide the basis for state crimes by creating the necessary incentives to commit them, such as community control, ideological control, economic interests and control. In the next stage, in the absence of barriers and control, the government will be in an Institutional anomie and will not refrain from taking any action to achieve its goals. If there are control mechanisms, the government uses neutralization and labeling techniques to overcome them. Ultimately, conditions such as ignorance, civic indifference, non-participation, fear of government, and obedience will contribute to the state crimes. When the government achieves its goals by committing state crimes, and there is no reaction against it, it will commit these crimes again through behavioral reinforcement. Repeating state crimes over and over again means that the government has learned to commit crimes against citizens and has made it as a behavioral trait for itself.
In the late 1980s, criminology became so entrenched in extreme truth-seeking, theoretical crisis, and the endless competition of theories that it required a dramatic transformation to survive. To solve this problem, criminologists, distancing themselves from modern paradigms, have opened their arms to perspectives that seek the future of criminology in the reconciliation of theories without theoretical competition and extreme simplification. Thus, integrative criminology was born. One of the strategies through which integrative criminology seeks to make criminological theories more profitable is the combination of criminological theories, which is referred to as an integrated theory approach. Despite some criticism, this approach was gradually adopted, and integrated theories were born one after another. However, like other criminological theories, most of the integrated theories in the field of street crime were made, and the integrated analysis of different types of white-collar crimes was ignored. One of the white-collar crimes that suffers from the lack of integrated theory is the violation of fundamental human rights by the governmental organization, which is called state crimes. The characteristics of these crimes, such as being organizational, complex, and related to the power structure, are such that they cannot be explained in just one dimension. Thus, there is no choice but to integrate different theories to explain the state crimes. To achieve this goal, we can use some mainstream criminology theories, such as opportunity, labeling, control theories, neutralization and anomie techniques, as well as critical theories, like Marxist and Structural criminology. Accordingly, by integrating the main propositions of these theories, one can explain state crimes in the form of an opportunistic process. The proposed theory focuses primarily on structural factors affecting the state crime. These factors include the political structure (with totalitarian and authoritarian rule), the ideology of the ruling class (supremacy arising from nationality, religion, class) and the economic structure (command or Free Market Economy) that provide the basis for state crimes by creating the necessary incentives to commit them, such as community control, ideological control, economic interests and control. In the next stage, in the absence of barriers and control, the government will be in an Institutional anomie and will not refrain from taking any action to achieve its goals. If there are control mechanisms, the government uses neutralization and labeling techniques to overcome them. Ultimately, conditions such as ignorance, civic indifference, non-participation, fear of government, and obedience will contribute to the state crimes. When the government achieves its goals by committing state crimes, and there is no reaction against it, it will commit these crimes again through behavioral reinforcement. Repeating state crimes over and over again means that the government has learned to commit crimes against citizens and has made it as a behavioral trait for itself.

Abstract According to the current provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, especially in the section related to the rules governing the discovery and prosecution of obvious and invisible crimes, any discovery of a crime and the initiation of criminal prosecution that occurs without taking these provisions into account is considered "illegal". The present study uses a descriptive-analytical method to explain the issue of what constitutes a guarantee for the implementation of an illegal initiation of criminal prosecution and how the disposition of evidence and discovered property is determined in this flawed process. The findings of the study show that, contrary to the prevailing practice that is limited to simply eliminating "illegitimate evidence", if the "initiation of prosecution" is inherently illegal (such as unauthorized intervention or unauthorized search), the entire prosecution process is subject to the nullity rule and the investigating authority is required to issue a "suspension of prosecution order". Also, the distinction between "nullity of prosecution" and "invalidity of evidence" is based on Articles 2, 13, and 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Finally, the study proves that issuing a suspension of prosecution order due to a lack of legal formalities will not prevent the issuance of an order to seize or destroy prohibited property resulting from a crime (based on Article 215 of the Islamic Penal Code) and these two categories (the fate of the proceedings and the fate of prohibited objects) are independent of each other.
Based on Article 36 of the Constitution, the aforementioned Article 2, and other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, a principle has been crystallized that has been identified as the “principle of legality of criminal proceedings”. According to this principle, none of the judicial officers and authorities can resort to illegal behavior to advance the criminal proceedings and collect evidence against the perpetrator. In judicial practice, however, the matter is very different; suppose that judicial officers are informed on a holiday while patrolling or during a phone call that a large amount of explosives have been stored in a residential building and that if they do not take immediate action, these munitions will be used in a sabotage act. They take action, discover and seize the explosives, arrest the perpetrator or perpetrators, prepare a report, and send it to the judicial authority. In another scenario, while inspecting a specific location in accordance with the order of a judicial authority, officers observe and discover tools, instruments, or other evidence of a crime that is unrelated to the order issued by the judicial authority. What is their duty in this situation? Current judicial and law enforcement procedures require them to seize these tools and instruments, prepare a report about them, and report to the judicial authority. It is also the case of discovering prohibited objects or tools and instruments of crime in the trunk or dashboard of a car (invisible) while passing through a stop and being inspected by police or other officers.
The present study seeks to find answers to the above questions using a descriptive-analytical method and library tools.
According to various articles of the law, especially the Criminal Procedure Code, criminal proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the law both at the beginning and at all subsequent stages. If criminal proceedings have been initiated illegally, including when an officer has intervened without legal authorization, which has led to the initiation of criminal prosecution, or if a crime has been discovered and prosecuted through illegal means, such as wiretapping or controlling bank accounts or illegal searches, it is not possible to decide on the permissibility of illegal actions and to continue the prosecution under the pretext of the need to combat crimes or maintain public order and security. Therefore, the effect of the requirement for the legality of criminal prosecution is to invalidate the illegal actions taken, as well as to terminate the illegal criminal prosecution. The judicial authority is obliged to declare the case closed by issuing a stay of prosecution order upon becoming aware and certain that the initial prosecution was initiated illegally. This guarantee of enforcement of nullity is in addition to the guarantee of criminal and disciplinary enforcement, which will be enforced against actors who have acted illegally and whose behavior has led to the discovery of a crime.
Judicial authorities and judicial officers cannot, under any pretext, even if it is to fight crime or maintain order, disregard the legal rules and regulations governing the discovery and initiation of prosecution and resort to illegal actions to discover and prosecute a crime. Since, unfortunately, the invalidation of criminal proceedings due to the illegal initiation of prosecution is not provided for as an explicit provision in the law, the specific proposal of the present study is that, in line with progressive legal systems, especially French law, which in Articles 802 and 170 to 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of this country provides for the guarantee of the implementation of invalidation for violations of basic procedures, and also inspired by the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which, based on Article 6 of the Convention (the right to a fair trial), rejects evidence and prosecutions resulting from gross violations of legal procedures, in future amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the requirements and requirements of the principle of legality of proceedings should be explicitly specified in the continuation of the text of Article 2 or in a note under this article in order to prevent the divergence of opinions in the courts. Of course, in the current situation, the judicial authorities have no obstacle to invalidating a prosecution that has been initiated illegally, and making such a decision will have the support and backing of various articles of the law (as studied in this research).

Abstract The issue of the crime of aggression against Iran in the Twelve-Day War is of great importance from the perspective of international criminal law, especially Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute. This research article examines the crime of aggression within the framework of international criminal law, focusing on the events of the Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel, and attempts to assess the compatibility of the military actions taken with the elements of the crime of aggression as stipulated in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute. The subject of the research is important because the crime of aggression, as the most serious act against international peace and security, requires the verification of precise material, psychological, and formal elements, and only includes leaders who had the actual authority to direct or control the act of aggression. The conflict in question, given the organized nature of the attacks and their consequences for the territorial integrity of Iran, provides a suitable space for analyzing existing legal criteria. The main issue of the research is whether the actions taken in this war are consistent with the criteria set out in the Kampala amendments and the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314, and if this compliance is established, what legal and political obstacles prevent the prosecution of the attacking leaders in the International Criminal Court. Examination of the elements of the crime shows that widespread and intentional attacks against the territory of an independent state, in the absence of a valid legal justification.

Abstract Israel’s 12-Day Assault on Iran in the Light of International Law: The Erosion of Legal Frameworks on the Use of Force
Extended Abstract
Abstract
This study employs a legal-philosophical analytical approach to examine Israel's 12-day attack on Iran within the framework of international law governing the use of force. Using a text-based interpretive method, the article assesses Israel's claim of self-defence through three interrelated dimensions: normative (compliance with Article 51 of the UN Charter), factual (application of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy), and structural-political (the impact of the securitisation discourse on the delegitimisation of international legal norms). Securitisation of law is defined here as a discursive process through which powerful actors construct existential threats and invoke exceptional necessity to reinterpret legal concepts, thereby freeing themselves from treaty constraints and subordinating peremptory norms to strategic interests
The central hypothesis posits that Israel's actions not only fail to meet the conditions of self-defence and constitute a clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force and Iran's territorial sovereignty but also reflect a broader crisis of legitimacy within the contemporary international legal order. The findings demonstrate that Iran's response was more consistent with the criteria of legitimate self-defence, being a reaction to an actual armed attack with due regard to necessity and immediacy. Conversely, the manifest double standards of the international community in addressing Israel's repeated breaches of international rules further exacerbate the legitimacy crisis of this legal system.


1. Introduction
On 13 June 2025, Israel launched ‘‘Operation Rising Lion’’, a coordinated 12-day military assault against Iran, targeting nuclear facilities, missile bases, military commanders, and civilian infrastructure. The United States provided intelligence, logistical support, and direct military participation. Israel justified the attacks as ‘‘preemptive self-defense’’ against Iran's existential nuclear threat, while Iran and international observers condemned them as a flagrant violation of the prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter). This conflict, later escalating into ‘‘Operation Ramadan’’ in February 2026, exposed deep crises in international law: the erosion of self-defense norms, institutional paralysis in the Security Council, and the selective application of legal standards by major powers.
The central research question examines whether Israel's actions satisfy Article 51 of the UN Charter and the criteria of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy, or whether they constitute unlawful aggression that undermines the post-World War II legal order. The study investigates this through three analytical dimensions: normative (interpretation of Article 51), operational (application of self-defense criteria), and structural-political (the securitization discourse enabling legal instrumentalization).

2. Literature Review
Scholarly discourse divides between restrictive interpretations of self-defense (requiring an actual armed attack, as affirmed by the ICJ in Nicaragua, the Wall Advisory Opinion, and Armed Activities in the Congo) and expansive approaches permitting anticipatory action against imminent threats under the Caroline test. Some scholars and states advocate a ‘‘last window of opportunity’’ doctrine in the context of WMD threats. Critics, including Milanovic and Saul, warn that such expansions create dangerous precedents, enabling unilateral aggression and undermining the prohibition on force. This study contributes by applying the securitization framework to analyze how powerful actors construct existential threats to reinterpret legal norms instrumentally.

3. Methodology
The research adopts a legal-philosophical analysis employing legal hermeneutics to interpret Article 51, Article 2(4), relevant Security Council resolutions, and ICJ jurisprudence. The tripartite framework-normative, operational, and structural-political-enables a comprehensive assessment that moves beyond formal legal analysis to consider the discursive and power dynamics that enable systematic violations of fundamental norms.

4. Results and Discussion
The findings demonstrate that Israel's assault lacks legal legitimacy across all three dimensions. At the normative level, Israel's claim of self-defense contradicts Article 51, which requires an actual armed attack—not a future or hypothetical threat. The ICJ's consistent jurisprudence establishes that self-defense is available only in response to an armed attack. Israel's preemptive action against an attack that had not occurred violates the fundamental jus cogens norm prohibiting the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4).
At the operational level, none of the essential conditions for self-defense were satisfied. Necessity was absent: Israel failed to provide evidence of an impending Iranian attack; IAEA reports showed no diversion toward weapons production; diplomatic options remained available. Proportionality was violated: the extensive attacks on nuclear sites, military targets, scientists, residential areas, and civilian infrastructure far exceeded any proportionate response to an alleged threat. The attacks also breached the humanitarian principle of distinction. Immediacy was lacking: Israel had long characterized Iran as a threat, but no urgent, imminent danger was established; the "last window" claim rested on speculative assumptions while IAEA monitoring continued and the Security Council had not been engaged.
The United States' participation similarly lacks legal foundation, as neither an armed attack nor an imminent threat from Iran was established. US support renders it a partner in aggression with corresponding international responsibility.
In contrast, Iran's response was consistent with self-defense criteria under Article 51. As the victim of an actual armed attack satisfying the ICJ's severity, attribution, and intent standards, Iran's limited, targeted response against military objectives respected principles of distinction and proportionality, demonstrating urgent necessity to prevent further aggression.
At the structural-political level, Israel's actions and the international community's selective response reveal a deeper legitimacy crisis. The securitization discourse—whereby powerful states construct existential threats to bypass legal constraints—has enabled the instrumentalization of concepts like self-defense and preemption, eroding normative foundations. Institutional failures compound this: the Security Council remains paralyzed by the US veto (over 53 vetoes shielding Israel since 1972), while states like Russia face swift sanctions for comparable violations. Evidentiary obstacles—Israel's obstruction of fact-finding, non-cooperation with the ICC, and non-compliance with ICJ rulings—further impede accountability, entrenching double standards that undermine the rule of law.

5. Conclusion
The three-level analysis confirms the central hypothesis: Israel's actions fail to meet the criteria for lawful self-defense, constitute a flagrant violation of the prohibition on the use of force and Iran's territorial sovereignty, and reflect a crisis of meaning in the international legal system where major powers misuse legal concepts to reproduce structural violence. Iran's defensive response, by contrast, was legally legitimate as a reaction to an actual armed attack.
This conflict is not merely regional but symbolizes a paradigmatic crisis. The current system, where legal concepts serve as tools for major power interests, can no longer balance state sovereignty and human rights. Without meaningful reforms—veto restriction, strengthening the ICC, universal jurisdiction, systematic documentation using new technologies, targeted sanctions, and enhanced civil society oversight—international norms will continue to erode, and structural violence will normalize.
The international community faces a choice: reinforce a rules-based system or accept destabilizing power politics. History demonstrates that silence in the face of fundamental violations weakens multilateralism and enables unilateral militarism. Only by moving beyond the current paradigm and restoring trust in international institutions can we preserve the legal order and establish a new equilibrium where human dignity and the rule of law prevail over the political interests of powerful states.
Keywords: Iran, Israel, self-defense, Article 51 of the UN Charter, preemptive self-defense, territorial sovereignty, prohibition of the use of force, securitization, structural violence.

Abstract The “12-Day War” waged by the occupying Israeli regime, with the support and backing of Western states—particularly the United States—was carried out through a series of military strikes and targeted assassinations, especially against Iran’s nuclear scientists. These actions, in addition to violating fundamental principles of international humanitarian law such as the principles of distinction and proportionality, can be analyzed from a criminological perspective as “state terrorism as a form of state crime.” The primary question of this study is the possibility of identifying and analyzing the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists within the framework of state crime. The study employs a conceptual–theoretical and comparative methodology, relying on sources from international law, humanitarian documents, and theories of state criminology to examine the criteria for the occurrence of state terrorism. The findings indicate that the assassinations possessed three essential components of state crime: commission by the government as a whole, systematic action, and human rights violations. Moreover, specific characteristics of state terrorism—such as organizational rationality, ideological justification of violence, institutionalization of repression, and collective intimidation—were also evident in the behavior of the Israeli regime. Accordingly, the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists during the 12-Day War can be considered a clear example of “systematic state terrorism” situated within the framework of state crime, carrying extensive legal and criminological implications in contemporary international law.

Abstract The military actions of the Zionist regime against Iran have not only exacerbated geopolitical tensions in the West Asian region, but have also created profound challenges for the international legal order. This article critically examines the legal legitimacy of these actions from the perspective of the right to use force and international humanitarian law. An analysis of Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51 of the UN Charter shows that the lack of evidence of an actual or imminent armed attack has made these attacks a violation of peremptory norms of international law. In the field of humanitarian law, the possible violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in targeting prisons, media centers, and hospitals raises serious questions about war crimes. From a strategic perspective, the present study analyzes the impact of these actions on Iran’s nuclear program, the non-proliferation regime, and the erosion of the principles of the UN Charter. The conclusion and theory of this article emphasizes the necessity of firm condemnation of the Zionist regime in international institutions and the withdrawal of international institutions from inaction to prevent instability and the weakening of rights-based peace.

Abstract The post-World War II international legal order rests upon two fundamental pillars: the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the humanization of conflict through International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Utilizing an analytical-normative methodology and a constructivist theoretical framework, this research analyzes the deconstructive consequences of the twelve-day military aggression by the Israeli regime and the United States in June/July 2025 as a critical juncture in the normative erosion of the current order. The core issue is examining how this twelve-day event transformed from an isolated violation into a systemic catalyst that undermines the intersubjective consensus on foundational rules. This action operated as a "speech act," redefining state identities and interests regarding basic norms. The dual consequences encompass the Jus ad Bellum level—practical invalidation of the non-use of force principle and the paralysis of the collective security system—and the Jus in Bello level, involving systemic breaches of the principles of distinction and proportionality. These breaches included civilian casualties from extensive airstrikes on residential areas, indiscriminate destruction of civilian and nuclear facilities, and targeted assassinations of commanders and scientists, leading to the normalization of total warfare patterns and the weakening of the Geneva Conventions. This process deepens the legitimacy crisis of central institutions like the Security Council and the (ICC), ultimately driving the world toward absolute normative anarchy by destroying minimal normative consensus, potentially signaling the end of the post-war peace project.

Abstract In the contemporary criminal justice system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the broad statutory provision of the death penalty for illicit narcotics offenses has fostered an institutional and procedural posture of marked ambivalence across adjudicative practices. Rather than producing a uniform and mechanical application of punitive statutes, this expansive legislative framework has compelled the judiciary to adopt a relative stance. Under statutory drug laws, capital punishment is prescribed across extensive thresholds of contraband weight and commercial transit; nevertheless, courtroom reality reveals a significant departure from statutory determinism. Guided by internal cognitive, ethical, and institutional variables, judges presiding over Revolutionary Courts and appellate chambers of the Supreme Court face heightened hesitation and moral friction when issuing irrevocable death sentences. Confronted with the finality of capital execution, adjudicators are increasingly reluctant to impose death solely on quantitative metrics, leading them to filter evidentiary records through discretionary assessments of individualized justice and blameworthiness.

Arising directly from this adjudicative tension, the present study investigates what effect the specific demographic and personal characteristics of defendants—chiefly gender, chronological and developmental age, national origin, and regional ethnicity—exert upon the progressive stages of the criminal process concerning capital drug offenses in Iran. Furthermore, the inquiry critically examines the degree of responsiveness and behavioral effectiveness exhibited by judges in dealing with and interpreting these extralegal variables. The central objective is to determine whether the procedural trajectory of a capital case—from pretrial investigation and prosecutorial indictment to evidentiary appraisal, conviction, and sentencing—is governed strictly by objective legal elements, or whether it is systematically mediated by the subjective judicial appraisal of the defendant’s social identity.

To examine this inquiry with empirical rigor, the study utilizes a qualitative design combining the content analysis of primary judicial documents with semi-structured elite field interviews. The documentary corpus comprises authentic case dossiers of defendants prosecuted for or sentenced to capital punishment for aggravated narcotics infractions. Through systematic analysis of police apprehension reports, prosecutorial interrogation transcripts, indictments, defense briefs, and the legal reasoning in final verdicts, the research tracks how defendant characteristics are evaluated across procedural milestones. This archival analysis is triangulated with in-depth qualitative interviews conducted with criminal court judges possessing substantial tenure in capital narcotics adjudication, as well as licensed defense attorneys specializing in capital drug litigation. This methodology captures the uncodified institutional norms and discretionary practices that govern judicial outcomes behind formal statutory texts.

The empirical findings demonstrate that the personal characteristics of the accused are decisive variables that actively modulate both the procedural handling and final substantive outcomes of capital narcotics cases. Far from administering a homogenous standard of justice, criminal justice administrators manifest distinct patterns of differential treatment based on the defendant's gender, age, ethnicity, nationality (specifically the presence of foreign nationals), and, in certain regional contexts, religious affiliation. These demographic factors directly alter how judges construct criminal intentionality (*mens rea*) and determine whether to exercise statutory discretion to avert the ultimate sanction.

This discretionary dynamic operates in a polarized manner across the adjudicative spectrum. In cases involving female defendants or youthful offenders with no prior criminal record, these variables frequently lead to a decrease in death sentences and proactive recourse to legal leniency institutions (*nahadha-ye erfaqi*). Influenced by institutional paternalism, judges often view female involvement through the lens of economic dependency, familial coercion, or marital subjugation. Consequently, courts regularly reclassify charges to non-capital roles, apply statutory mitigation, or recommend executive clemency via the Pardon and Leniency Commission. Similarly, when adjudicating young, non-recidivist defendants, judges experience profound ethical reluctance to permanently end young lives with perceived rehabilitative potential, frequently resolving evidentiary doubts in favor of the accused under Islamic jurisprudential principles such as the rule of *Dar’* to substitute capital punishment with custodial terms.

Conversely, the findings reveal an acute asymmetry regarding nationality: in cases involving foreign nationals—most notably Afghan nationals intercepted along eastern transit corridors—judicial hesitation dissolves in favor of strict statutory formalism and an absence of leniency. Deprived of the local kinship networks, social capital, and community mediation channels accessible to domestic citizens, foreign defendants face an adjudicative environment dominated by security concerns and deterrence. Criminal justice administrators tend to view foreign offenders primarily as links in organized transnational syndicates rather than vulnerable individuals, creating substantial barriers to discretionary mitigation, alternative interpretations of intent, or post-conviction clemency.

In conclusion, the study illustrates that judicial hesitation in Iranian capital drug jurisprudence is profoundly contingent. While internal judicial variables foster procedural leniency and charge recharacterization for female and youthful defendants, they harden into unyielding punitive severity when applied to foreign nationals and marginalized demographics, demonstrating that extralegal characteristics fundamentally shape the boundary between life and death in the administration of criminal justice.