Attacks on universities and educational and research centers from the perspective of international humanitarian law
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.419817.2101
Fatemeh Keyhanlou
Abstract Abstract
The military operations conducted by the United States and Israel against certain Iranian universities, educational institutions, and research centers have generated significant legal debate concerning the status of such facilities under international humanitarian law. These attacks have raised fundamental questions regarding the legal protection afforded to universities and research institutions during armed conflicts, the circumstances under which they may lawfully become military objectives, and the extent to which international humanitarian law permits attacks against them.
International humanitarian law is founded upon the principle of distinction, which requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives. Educational institutions, universities, and civilian research centers are generally regarded as civilian objects and therefore enjoy protection against attack unless and for such time as they become military objectives in accordance with the criteria established by international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the practical application of these principles is often complicated by the evolving nature of modern warfare, particularly where civilian infrastructure performs functions that may indirectly or directly contribute to military capabilities.
This article seeks to examine the legal status of universities and educational and research centers under international humanitarian law by addressing the following principal research question: Under what circumstances may universities and research institutions lawfully lose their civilian protection and become legitimate military objectives? In answering this question, the article also considers whether recent attacks against Iranian universities and research facilities can be justified under the applicable rules of international humanitarian law or whether they constitute violations of the legal protections afforded to civilian infrastructure.
The study employs a doctrinal legal research methodology based upon the systematic analysis of international treaties, customary international humanitarian law and relevant soft-law instruments.
The findings demonstrate that, from the perspective of international humanitarian law, universities and educational and research centers may be classified into two broad legal categories. The first category consists of military educational institutions, including military academies, officer training universities, defense colleges, and research centers that are organizationally integrated into the armed forces of a State. Because these institutions are established primarily to support military operations, train military personnel, or directly contribute to national defense capabilities, they are military objectives by their very nature and are governed by the rules applicable to military installations under international humanitarian law.
The second category comprises civilian universities, public and private educational institutions, scientific laboratories, and civilian research centers that are not organizationally affiliated with the armed forces. As a general rule, these institutions constitute civilian objects and therefore benefit from protection against military attack. Their destruction cannot be justified merely because weakening a State’s educational, scientific, or technological capacity may indirectly diminish its long-term national strength. Rather, the protection of such institutions reflects the broader objective of international humanitarian law to preserve civilian life and civilian infrastructure during armed conflict and to minimize unnecessary human suffering.
Although neither the Hague Conventions nor the Geneva Conventions expressly identify universities and research institutions as a distinct protected category, their protection is derived from the general principles governing civilian objects, particularly the principles of distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and precaution. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions further reinforces these protections by prohibiting attacks directed against civilian objects unless they effectively contribute to military operation and their destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage under the circumstances prevailing at the time of the attack. Furthermore, a growing body of soft-law instruments developed specifically to safeguard education during armed conflict strengthens the normative expectation that educational institutions should remain protected from the effects of hostilities whenever possible.
The study further concludes that maintaining the civilian character of universities and research institutions is not solely the responsibility of the attacking party; States exercising control over such facilities also bear important obligations under international humanitarian law to preserve their protected status and reduce the risk of incidental harm, they should refrain, as far as practicable, from locating military installations, deploying military personnel, storing weapons, or conducting military operations within or in the immediate vicinity of universities and civilian research centers. The deliberate use of civilian educational facilities to shield military assets or military activities may compromise their protected status and expose them to lawful attack under the rules governing military objectives.
Accordingly, this article concludes that the legal status of universities and educational and research institutions under international humanitarian law depends not upon their formal designation but upon their actual functions and contribution to military operations. Civilian universities enjoy comprehensive legal protection against attack unless they lose that protection by becoming military objectives under the strict criteria established by international humanitarian law. Any interpretation that broadly permits attacks against educational institutions solely because of their scientific activities, technological capabilities, or potential future contribution to national development would undermine the humanitarian objectives of the law of armed conflict and significantly weaken the protection afforded to civilian infrastructure.
Keywords: Universities and Educational-Research Centers, Military Objectives, Principle of Precaution, Principle of Distinction, Principle of Proportionality, Military Advantage.
Modifying the Defendant’s Confrontation with Witnesses in Domestic Violence Cases: A Comparative Study of Iranian and Saudi Arabian Law in Light of International Standards
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.419090.2098
Mohammad Nasiri, Amirmohammad Nasiri
Abstract Introduction and Objective:
Domestic violence cases present a distinctive evidentiary and procedural difficulty because the victim is frequently also the principal, and sometimes the only, witness to the offence. Unlike many ordinary crimes, domestic violence often occurs in private, within an ongoing intimate or familial relationship, and in circumstances marked by emotional, economic, or social dependence. Requiring the victim-witness to testify in the direct physical presence of the accused may therefore intensify fear, psychological pressure, secondary victimization, and the risk of retaliation. At the same time, restricting direct confrontation may affect the defendant’s right to know, examine, and challenge incriminating evidence. The central question is thus whether the defendant’s confrontation right necessarily requires face-to-face physical encounter or whether its manner of exercise may be modified while its essential defensive function is preserved.
The comparison between Iran and Saudi Arabia is particularly relevant because both legal systems have adopted general frameworks for protecting witnesses and other persons exposed to danger during criminal proceedings. In Iran, Note 1 to Article 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the 2015 Executive Regulation on the Protection of Witnesses and Informants provide measures such as preventing direct confrontation, concealing identity, remote testimony, and security protection. Saudi Arabia enacted the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, Witnesses, Experts, and Victims in 2024 and issued its Executive Regulation in 2026. Although the two frameworks differ in legislative status and personal scope, they perform comparable functions and can therefore be assessed against international standards concerning victim protection, fair trial guarantees, necessity, proportionality, and individualized risk assessment.
Methodology:
This study employs a descriptive-analytical and comparative method. It first examines the conceptual content of the right of confrontation and distinguishes direct physical confrontation from the broader right to obtain sufficient knowledge of testimonial evidence and to challenge its credibility and reliability. It then analyzes relevant international instruments, including the United Nations Updated Model Strategies and Practical Measures, the Istanbul Convention, and CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35. Finally, the study compares Iranian and Saudi legislation regarding the persons entitled to protection, alternatives to direct confrontation, confidentiality of identity, remote testimony, risk assessment, continuity of protection, and compensatory safeguards for the defence.
Findings and Analysis:
International standards do not treat physical confrontation as an absolute requirement in every case. They permit protective arrangements where direct encounter creates a serious risk of intimidation, retaliation, psychological harm, or secondary victimization. Measures such as separate testimony rooms, audiovisual communication, intermediated questioning, restricted contact with the accused, confidentiality, and protection orders may therefore be justified. Nevertheless, such restrictions must be based on necessity and proportionality, tailored to the circumstances of the individual case, and accompanied by safeguards enabling the defendant to understand the substance of the evidence and challenge it effectively. The decisive distinction is therefore between the physical form of confrontation and its procedural function.
Iranian law recognizes several alternatives to face-to-face testimony. The Executive Regulation permits remote testimony, separate hearing arrangements, concealment of identity and personal information, and physical or residential protection. These mechanisms can be useful in domestic violence cases, especially where the victim-witness fears the accused or remains connected to him through residence, children, or financial dependence. However, the Iranian framework is primarily witness-oriented. A woman subjected to domestic violence is not independently protected merely because she is a victim with a particular vulnerability; she generally benefits from the Regulation only when she qualifies as a witness or informant and when the judicial authority identifies a relevant danger. This is a significant limitation because, in domestic violence cases, the witness is often the victim herself. The law does not expressly treat the continuing intimate relationship, prior patterns of abuse, dependence, child-related concerns, or the likelihood of post-trial retaliation as independent criteria of risk. Moreover, the evidentiary weight of anonymous testimony and the compensatory safeguards required where the defence cannot examine the witness directly remain insufficiently clarified.
Saudi law provides a broader personal and institutional framework. Article 1 of the 2024 Law expressly includes the “victim” alongside whistleblowers, witnesses, and experts and extends protection to spouses, relatives, and other closely connected persons exposed to danger. Article 2 requires competent authorities, where appropriate, to conceal identifying information. Article 3 authorizes remote testimony, alteration of voice and image, prevention of visual contact, and hearing testimony separately from the accused and counsel. It also provides a limited mechanism for disclosure where identity is necessary for the exercise of the right of defence and the testimony constitutes the sole evidence. Articles 7 to 10 regulate admission to the protection programme, while Article 9 requires consideration of the nature of the danger, gravity of the offence, psychological condition, adaptability, and available alternatives. Article 14 provides security, legal, psychological, social, residential, occupational, and financial protection. The 2026 Executive Regulation further emphasizes continuous risk assessment, modification or continuation of protective measures, and extension of protection to closely connected persons where necessary.
Despite these advantages, the Saudi framework was not designed specifically for domestic violence and is limited to serious arrestable offences. Consequently, some recurrent but legally less severe forms of domestic abuse may remain outside its scope. In addition, merely informing the accused or counsel of the substance of testimony does not invariably satisfy the right of defence unless a practical opportunity exists to submit questions and contest credibility.
Conclusion:
The study concludes that modifying direct confrontation in domestic violence cases is not inherently inconsistent with a fair trial. The essential content of confrontation lies in effective knowledge, questioning, and challenge rather than compulsory physical encounter. Saudi law offers a more victim-oriented framework than Iranian law because it expressly recognizes victims and provides broader, continuing, and multidimensional protection. Iranian law nevertheless contains important procedural tools but should expressly include domestic violence victims, adopt individualized and continuing risk assessment, clarify the evidentiary status of protected testimony, and require effective compensatory safeguards. In both systems, the preferable model is one that prevents harmful face-to-face confrontation while preserving the defendant’s genuine ability to test the evidence.
Terrorist Attacks against military targets and Armed Forces in International law
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.418861.2097
Mohsen abdollahi
Abstract Terrorist attacks against military targets and armed forces in international law
Short Abstract
International terrorist groups have become stronger than before. Nowadays, they can not only plan and implement terrorist attacks to public properties but also dare to threat and attack military targets including military facilities and armed forces. Furthermore, both acts of aggression by the US and Israel against Iran in 2025 and 2026—which led to the ‘12-Day War’ and the ‘Ramadan War’—began with the widespread assassination of Iranian military commanders. This is while the traditional definition of terrorism defines this violence as attacks on civilians, public and government facilities to create a climate of intimidation and terror in society. So, targeting military objects raises some important questions on the legal description of the attack and its applicable law, respectively. This article seeks to answer whether an attack by a terrorist group against military facilities and armed forces of a State is a terrorist attack and, if so, how the anti-terrorism law should be applied in confronting it. The author hypothesizes that attacks against military facilities and armed forces are deemed terrorist attacks in situations where they would not have been taking part actively in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict.
Extended English Abstract
International terrorist groups have become stronger than before. Nowadays, they can not only plan and implement terrorist attacks to public properties but also dare to threat and attack military targets including military facilities and armed forces. Furthermore, both acts of aggression by the US and Israel against Iran in 2025 and 2026—which led to the ‘12-Day War’ and the ‘Ramadan War’—began with the widespread assassination of Iranian military commanders. This is while the traditional definition of terrorism defines this violence as attacks on civilians and public and government facilities in order to create a climate of intimidation and terror in society. Therefore, when terrorist groups attack a military target or armed forces, important questions arise regarding the legal description of the attack and, consequently, the applicable laws to counter it. The main question is when a purely military target or armed forces are targeted by terrorist groups with political motives, can the attack be considered a terrorist attack and consequently, applied international rights and obligations regarding counter-terrorism to that attack and its perpetrators?
In response to this question, this article attempts to prove the hypothesis that attacks on military targets and armed forces during times other than armed conflicts are considered terrorist acts and that counter-terrorism laws, including anti-terrorism conventions, are applicable to them.
The article concludes by using the library collection method of its sources and the systematic analysis research method to prove its hypothesis: A significant number of international counter-terrorism conventions were adopted at a time when most terrorist acts were individual. Individual terrorism, while dangerous, is not capable of threatening military objectives. For this very reason, until the last decade of the 20th century, governments and international and regional organizations did not consider attacks against military targets and armed forces as terrorist and excluded them from international and regional anti-terrorism instruments. The growth of religious extremism, along with the communications revolution, has provided the basis for the emergence and growth of transnational and organized terrorism. Unlike individual terrorism, this type of terrorism has the ability to attack military targets and armed forces. Military sites and armed forces who are not engaged in active hostilities are in practice no different from public places and civilians, and at the same time they are a tempting target for a terrorist group to demonstrate its power and legitimize. In such circumstances, the exclusion of attacks against military targets and military personnel from the definition of terrorism and inclusion of the counter-terrorism instruments would be a gift to terrorist groups. The legal rule must follow and regulate the legal reality, otherwise, the law will remain abandoned.
A review of developments in counter-terrorism documents indicates that the legal rule is moving in the aforementioned direction: the counter-terrorism conventions adopted in the late 2000s have extended their provisions to attacks against military targets and armed forces, provided that the targets or armed forces being attacked are not engaged in an active armed conflict. The latter condition is important from two perspectives. First, the interference of different legal regimes must be avoided: the application of counter-terrorism law during armed conflicts, where humanitarian law is applicable, would create serious problems in determining the rights and obligations of the parties to the conflict. Second, the meaning and application of the phrase “period of armed conflict” is problematic. Because there are situations during armed conflicts that, although covered by international humanitarian law, do not necessarily constitute an armed conflict in the strict sense of the word, care must be taken to ensure that the application of counter-terrorism law does not weaken the parties to the conflict, particularly the people fighting against occupation.
Keywords: terrorism, military targets, military personnel, armed conflict periods, humanitarian law.
Criminal Policy Based on Liberal Ideology in Response to Platform-Based Virtual Criminal Activities: From Liberalism to Post-Neoliberalism
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.415867.2086
Azim Aghababaei Taghanaki, Seyed Doraid Mousavi Mojab, Mohammad Jafar Habibzadeh, Pejman Mohammadi
Abstract A) Introduction
In recent decades, the rapid proliferation of virtual platforms and social networks has fundamentally transformed the landscape of crime and deviance. Platform-based cyber criminal activities — that is, crimes and deviations that exploit digital platforms as instruments or environments for their commission — are increasing not only in volume and variety, but also differ substantially from traditional offenses in terms of structure, actors, and social consequences. These crimes transcend geographical boundaries, create complex causal chains among platforms, users, and victims, and frequently occupy the grey zone between crime, deviance, and commercial conduct. The transnational nature of these offenses and the multi-layered structure of host platforms have created serious challenges for jurisdictional authority, criminal attribution, and the enforcement of judicial decisions. What further complicates this challenge is the economic power and political influence of transnational platform corporations, which frequently contest the capacity of national governments to exercise judicial sovereignty. Despite this, criminal policy scholarship has predominantly focused on the technical and criminological dimensions of this phenomenon, neglecting the ideological-structural analysis of criminal policy models in response to it. This theoretical neglect assumes particular significance at a time when major ideological shifts from neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism are underway and states are searching for new strategies to regulate the digital space, thereby reinforcing the necessity and urgency of the present study.
B) Research Objectives
The primary objective of this study is to analyze and compare the criminal policy characteristics of four liberal paradigms —classical liberalism, modern liberalism, neoliberalism, and post-neoliberalism— in response to platform-based virtual criminal activities. The study seeks to demonstrate what approach each of these ideologies adopts with respect to crime prevention, criminalization, punitive and non-punitive responses, the role of the state and society, and the treatment of deviance in the virtual platform environment. Furthermore, the study aims to show how the distinct philosophical foundations of these ideologies —from the primacy of individual liberty in classical liberalism to the emphasis on distributive justice in post-neoliberalism— lead to divergent and at times contradictory policy strategies. The secondary objective is to identify points of convergence and divergence among these approaches and to critically evaluate each paradigm's capacity to address the complexities of this domain, thereby laying the groundwork for constructive dialogue among competing models and facilitating the development of more effective criminal policy frameworks.
C) Research Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative approach and employs a descriptive-analytical method. Data were collected through a systematic review of library sources, including books, peer-reviewed articles, legal documents, and authoritative policy reports in the fields of criminal policy, criminology, and political theory. The analytical framework was designed around six comparative axes: crime prevention and non-punitive responses, criminalization and punitive responses, communal responses, state responses, responses to crime, and responses to deviance. These axes were developed drawing on comparative criminal policy literature and enable the systematic measurement of ideological differences at the level of operational strategies. Each paradigm was first analyzed independently on the basis of primary theoretical sources, and similarities and differences among them were subsequently extracted through structured comparative analysis.
D) Research Findings
The findings reveal that classical liberalism, grounded in the principle of minimal state intervention, restricts criminalization to overt violations of individual rights, situates prevention within the sphere of individual responsibility, and regards punishment as an instrument of rational deterrence. Within this paradigm, deviant behavior in virtual platform spaces is treated as a private matter, the state assumes a minimal regulatory role, and the responsibility for protecting users rests essentially with the users themselves. Modern liberalism, accepting a more active role for the welfare state, prioritizes social prevention, balances criminalization with guarantees of fundamental user rights, and favors rehabilitative and restorative responses over purely retributive punishment; within this framework, platforms are obligated to comply with human rights standards and remain accountable to public institutions, and democratic oversight of their conduct is regarded as essential. Neoliberalism subordinates criminal policy to the logic of economic efficiency, favors platform self-regulation, regards punitive mechanisms as amenable to private-sector outsourcing, and substitutes situational prevention through market mechanisms for direct state intervention; the consequence of this approach is the transfer of regulatory power from public institutions to technology corporations and, as a result, the weakening of democratic accountability. Post-neoliberalism, by contrast, treats digital territorial sovereignty as a foundational principle, deems the criminalization of structural platform abuses essential, rejects the privatization of criminal justice as an undermining of the rule of law, and places victim compensation alongside punishment at the center of its policy agenda; this approach also places particular emphasis on the participation of affected groups in criminal policy-making processes.
E) Conclusion
The comparative analysis of the four liberal paradigms demonstrates that, despite sharing common liberal foundations, these approaches offer distinct and at times contradictory strategies for addressing platform-based cybercrimes. None of these models is free from structural weaknesses: classical liberalism lacks adequate regulatory instruments; neoliberalism reduces justice to a commodity; modern liberalism grapples with unresolved tensions between liberty and digital security; and post-neoliberalism risks sliding toward digital authoritarianism under the guise of territorial sovereignty. These structural contradictions reveal that platform-based cybercrimes constitute a phenomenon that exceeds the analytical capacity of any single ideology and requires an intersubjective and multidimensional approach. Accordingly, designing an effective criminal policy in response to these offenses requires moving beyond ideologically pure frameworks, drawing on the strengths of each approach, and engaging in critical and constructive dialogue among these competing models.
The Criminology of State Crime from the Perspective of Integrated Theory
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.412983.2078
hossein javadi hosseinabadi
Abstract In the late 1980s, criminology became so entrenched in extreme truth-seeking, theoretical crisis, and the endless competition of theories that it required a dramatic transformation to survive. To solve this problem, criminologists, distancing themselves from modern paradigms, have opened their arms to perspectives that seek the future of criminology in the reconciliation of theories without theoretical competition and extreme simplification. Thus, integrative criminology was born. One of the strategies through which integrative criminology seeks to make criminological theories more profitable is the combination of criminological theories, which is referred to as an integrated theory approach. Despite some criticism, this approach was gradually adopted, and integrated theories were born one after another. However, like other criminological theories, most of the integrated theories in the field of street crime were made, and the integrated analysis of different types of white-collar crimes was ignored. One of the white-collar crimes that suffers from the lack of integrated theory is the violation of fundamental human rights by the governmental organization, which is called state crimes. The characteristics of these crimes, such as being organizational, complex, and related to the power structure, are such that they cannot be explained in just one dimension. Thus, there is no choice but to integrate different theories to explain the state crimes. To achieve this goal, we can use some mainstream criminology theories, such as opportunity, labeling, control theories, neutralization and anomie techniques, as well as critical theories, like Marxist and Structural criminology. Accordingly, by integrating the main propositions of these theories, one can explain state crimes in the form of an opportunistic process. The proposed theory focuses primarily on structural factors affecting the state crime. These factors include the political structure (with totalitarian and authoritarian rule), the ideology of the ruling class (supremacy arising from nationality, religion, class) and the economic structure (command or Free Market Economy) that provide the basis for state crimes by creating the necessary incentives to commit them, such as community control, ideological control, economic interests and control. In the next stage, in the absence of barriers and control, the government will be in an Institutional anomie and will not refrain from taking any action to achieve its goals. If there are control mechanisms, the government uses neutralization and labeling techniques to overcome them. Ultimately, conditions such as ignorance, civic indifference, non-participation, fear of government, and obedience will contribute to the state crimes. When the government achieves its goals by committing state crimes, and there is no reaction against it, it will commit these crimes again through behavioral reinforcement. Repeating state crimes over and over again means that the government has learned to commit crimes against citizens and has made it as a behavioral trait for itself.
In the late 1980s, criminology became so entrenched in extreme truth-seeking, theoretical crisis, and the endless competition of theories that it required a dramatic transformation to survive. To solve this problem, criminologists, distancing themselves from modern paradigms, have opened their arms to perspectives that seek the future of criminology in the reconciliation of theories without theoretical competition and extreme simplification. Thus, integrative criminology was born. One of the strategies through which integrative criminology seeks to make criminological theories more profitable is the combination of criminological theories, which is referred to as an integrated theory approach. Despite some criticism, this approach was gradually adopted, and integrated theories were born one after another. However, like other criminological theories, most of the integrated theories in the field of street crime were made, and the integrated analysis of different types of white-collar crimes was ignored. One of the white-collar crimes that suffers from the lack of integrated theory is the violation of fundamental human rights by the governmental organization, which is called state crimes. The characteristics of these crimes, such as being organizational, complex, and related to the power structure, are such that they cannot be explained in just one dimension. Thus, there is no choice but to integrate different theories to explain the state crimes. To achieve this goal, we can use some mainstream criminology theories, such as opportunity, labeling, control theories, neutralization and anomie techniques, as well as critical theories, like Marxist and Structural criminology. Accordingly, by integrating the main propositions of these theories, one can explain state crimes in the form of an opportunistic process. The proposed theory focuses primarily on structural factors affecting the state crime. These factors include the political structure (with totalitarian and authoritarian rule), the ideology of the ruling class (supremacy arising from nationality, religion, class) and the economic structure (command or Free Market Economy) that provide the basis for state crimes by creating the necessary incentives to commit them, such as community control, ideological control, economic interests and control. In the next stage, in the absence of barriers and control, the government will be in an Institutional anomie and will not refrain from taking any action to achieve its goals. If there are control mechanisms, the government uses neutralization and labeling techniques to overcome them. Ultimately, conditions such as ignorance, civic indifference, non-participation, fear of government, and obedience will contribute to the state crimes. When the government achieves its goals by committing state crimes, and there is no reaction against it, it will commit these crimes again through behavioral reinforcement. Repeating state crimes over and over again means that the government has learned to commit crimes against citizens and has made it as a behavioral trait for itself.
"Illegal" initiation of criminal prosecution; scope and guarantee of execution
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.408625.2065
seyyes sajjad kazemi
Abstract According to the current provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, especially in the section related to the rules governing the discovery and prosecution of obvious and invisible crimes, any discovery of a crime and the initiation of criminal prosecution that occurs without taking these provisions into account is considered "illegal". The present study uses a descriptive-analytical method to explain the issue of what constitutes a guarantee for the implementation of an illegal initiation of criminal prosecution and how the disposition of evidence and discovered property is determined in this flawed process. The findings of the study show that, contrary to the prevailing practice that is limited to simply eliminating "illegitimate evidence", if the "initiation of prosecution" is inherently illegal (such as unauthorized intervention or unauthorized search), the entire prosecution process is subject to the nullity rule and the investigating authority is required to issue a "suspension of prosecution order". Also, the distinction between "nullity of prosecution" and "invalidity of evidence" is based on Articles 2, 13, and 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Finally, the study proves that issuing a suspension of prosecution order due to a lack of legal formalities will not prevent the issuance of an order to seize or destroy prohibited property resulting from a crime (based on Article 215 of the Islamic Penal Code) and these two categories (the fate of the proceedings and the fate of prohibited objects) are independent of each other.
Based on Article 36 of the Constitution, the aforementioned Article 2, and other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, a principle has been crystallized that has been identified as the “principle of legality of criminal proceedings”. According to this principle, none of the judicial officers and authorities can resort to illegal behavior to advance the criminal proceedings and collect evidence against the perpetrator. In judicial practice, however, the matter is very different; suppose that judicial officers are informed on a holiday while patrolling or during a phone call that a large amount of explosives have been stored in a residential building and that if they do not take immediate action, these munitions will be used in a sabotage act. They take action, discover and seize the explosives, arrest the perpetrator or perpetrators, prepare a report, and send it to the judicial authority. In another scenario, while inspecting a specific location in accordance with the order of a judicial authority, officers observe and discover tools, instruments, or other evidence of a crime that is unrelated to the order issued by the judicial authority. What is their duty in this situation? Current judicial and law enforcement procedures require them to seize these tools and instruments, prepare a report about them, and report to the judicial authority. It is also the case of discovering prohibited objects or tools and instruments of crime in the trunk or dashboard of a car (invisible) while passing through a stop and being inspected by police or other officers.
The present study seeks to find answers to the above questions using a descriptive-analytical method and library tools.
According to various articles of the law, especially the Criminal Procedure Code, criminal proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the law both at the beginning and at all subsequent stages. If criminal proceedings have been initiated illegally, including when an officer has intervened without legal authorization, which has led to the initiation of criminal prosecution, or if a crime has been discovered and prosecuted through illegal means, such as wiretapping or controlling bank accounts or illegal searches, it is not possible to decide on the permissibility of illegal actions and to continue the prosecution under the pretext of the need to combat crimes or maintain public order and security. Therefore, the effect of the requirement for the legality of criminal prosecution is to invalidate the illegal actions taken, as well as to terminate the illegal criminal prosecution. The judicial authority is obliged to declare the case closed by issuing a stay of prosecution order upon becoming aware and certain that the initial prosecution was initiated illegally. This guarantee of enforcement of nullity is in addition to the guarantee of criminal and disciplinary enforcement, which will be enforced against actors who have acted illegally and whose behavior has led to the discovery of a crime.
Judicial authorities and judicial officers cannot, under any pretext, even if it is to fight crime or maintain order, disregard the legal rules and regulations governing the discovery and initiation of prosecution and resort to illegal actions to discover and prosecute a crime. Since, unfortunately, the invalidation of criminal proceedings due to the illegal initiation of prosecution is not provided for as an explicit provision in the law, the specific proposal of the present study is that, in line with progressive legal systems, especially French law, which in Articles 802 and 170 to 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of this country provides for the guarantee of the implementation of invalidation for violations of basic procedures, and also inspired by the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which, based on Article 6 of the Convention (the right to a fair trial), rejects evidence and prosecutions resulting from gross violations of legal procedures, in future amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the requirements and requirements of the principle of legality of proceedings should be explicitly specified in the continuation of the text of Article 2 or in a note under this article in order to prevent the divergence of opinions in the courts. Of course, in the current situation, the judicial authorities have no obstacle to invalidating a prosecution that has been initiated illegally, and making such a decision will have the support and backing of various articles of the law (as studied in this research).
The Crime of Aggression against Iran in the Twelve-Day War: Analysis of the Elements of the Crime and the Possibility of Prosecuting the Aggressor Leaders under Article 8bis of the Rome Statute
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.406569.2056
Vahid Kiomarsi
Abstract The issue of the crime of aggression against Iran in the Twelve-Day War is of great importance from the perspective of international criminal law, especially Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute. This research article examines the crime of aggression within the framework of international criminal law, focusing on the events of the Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel, and attempts to assess the compatibility of the military actions taken with the elements of the crime of aggression as stipulated in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute. The subject of the research is important because the crime of aggression, as the most serious act against international peace and security, requires the verification of precise material, psychological, and formal elements, and only includes leaders who had the actual authority to direct or control the act of aggression. The conflict in question, given the organized nature of the attacks and their consequences for the territorial integrity of Iran, provides a suitable space for analyzing existing legal criteria. The main issue of the research is whether the actions taken in this war are consistent with the criteria set out in the Kampala amendments and the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314, and if this compliance is established, what legal and political obstacles prevent the prosecution of the attacking leaders in the International Criminal Court. Examination of the elements of the crime shows that widespread and intentional attacks against the territory of an independent state, in the absence of a valid legal justification.
State Terrorism: A Reflection on the Assassination of Iran’s Nuclear Scientists from the Perspective of State Crime
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.404175.2051
Nabiollah gholami
Abstract The “12-Day War” waged by the occupying Israeli regime, with the support and backing of Western states—particularly the United States—was carried out through a series of military strikes and targeted assassinations, especially against Iran’s nuclear scientists. These actions, in addition to violating fundamental principles of international humanitarian law such as the principles of distinction and proportionality, can be analyzed from a criminological perspective as “state terrorism as a form of state crime.” The primary question of this study is the possibility of identifying and analyzing the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists within the framework of state crime. The study employs a conceptual–theoretical and comparative methodology, relying on sources from international law, humanitarian documents, and theories of state criminology to examine the criteria for the occurrence of state terrorism. The findings indicate that the assassinations possessed three essential components of state crime: commission by the government as a whole, systematic action, and human rights violations. Moreover, specific characteristics of state terrorism—such as organizational rationality, ideological justification of violence, institutionalization of repression, and collective intimidation—were also evident in the behavior of the Israeli regime. Accordingly, the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists during the 12-Day War can be considered a clear example of “systematic state terrorism” situated within the framework of state crime, carrying extensive legal and criminological implications in contemporary international law.
Israel's military action against Iran: From legitimacy assessment to strategic consequences in the international legal order
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.403493.2045
ehsan salimi, Sepideh Bouzari
Abstract The military actions of the Zionist regime against Iran have not only exacerbated geopolitical tensions in the West Asian region, but have also created profound challenges for the international legal order. This article critically examines the legal legitimacy of these actions from the perspective of the right to use force and international humanitarian law. An analysis of Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51 of the UN Charter shows that the lack of evidence of an actual or imminent armed attack has made these attacks a violation of peremptory norms of international law. In the field of humanitarian law, the possible violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in targeting prisons, media centers, and hospitals raises serious questions about war crimes. From a strategic perspective, the present study analyzes the impact of these actions on Iran’s nuclear program, the non-proliferation regime, and the erosion of the principles of the UN Charter. The conclusion and theory of this article emphasizes the necessity of firm condemnation of the Zionist regime in international institutions and the withdrawal of international institutions from inaction to prevent instability and the weakening of rights-based peace.
The Collapse of the International Legal Order: Assessing the Consequences of the Twelve-Day War Against Iran on the United Nations Charter and International Humanitarian Law
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.400989.2029
Hassan Husseini
Abstract The post-World War II international legal order rests upon two fundamental pillars: the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the humanization of conflict through International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Utilizing an analytical-normative methodology and a constructivist theoretical framework, this research analyzes the deconstructive consequences of the twelve-day military aggression by the Israeli regime and the United States in June/July 2025 as a critical juncture in the normative erosion of the current order. The core issue is examining how this twelve-day event transformed from an isolated violation into a systemic catalyst that undermines the intersubjective consensus on foundational rules. This action operated as a "speech act," redefining state identities and interests regarding basic norms. The dual consequences encompass the Jus ad Bellum level—practical invalidation of the non-use of force principle and the paralysis of the collective security system—and the Jus in Bello level, involving systemic breaches of the principles of distinction and proportionality. These breaches included civilian casualties from extensive airstrikes on residential areas, indiscriminate destruction of civilian and nuclear facilities, and targeted assassinations of commanders and scientists, leading to the normalization of total warfare patterns and the weakening of the Geneva Conventions. This process deepens the legitimacy crisis of central institutions like the Security Council and the (ICC), ultimately driving the world toward absolute normative anarchy by destroying minimal normative consensus, potentially signaling the end of the post-war peace project.
The punishment system for drug crimes in the context of the variables of the defendant's gender, age, and nationality.
Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 03 November 2026
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.391351.1985
nasim khodakhah, mohammad farahjiha, abbas sheykholeslami
Abstract In the contemporary criminal justice system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the broad statutory provision of the death penalty for illicit narcotics offenses has fostered an institutional and procedural posture of marked ambivalence across adjudicative practices. Rather than producing a uniform and mechanical application of punitive statutes, this expansive legislative framework has compelled the judiciary to adopt a relative stance. Under statutory drug laws, capital punishment is prescribed across extensive thresholds of contraband weight and commercial transit; nevertheless, courtroom reality reveals a significant departure from statutory determinism. Guided by internal cognitive, ethical, and institutional variables, judges presiding over Revolutionary Courts and appellate chambers of the Supreme Court face heightened hesitation and moral friction when issuing irrevocable death sentences. Confronted with the finality of capital execution, adjudicators are increasingly reluctant to impose death solely on quantitative metrics, leading them to filter evidentiary records through discretionary assessments of individualized justice and blameworthiness.
Arising directly from this adjudicative tension, the present study investigates what effect the specific demographic and personal characteristics of defendants—chiefly gender, chronological and developmental age, national origin, and regional ethnicity—exert upon the progressive stages of the criminal process concerning capital drug offenses in Iran. Furthermore, the inquiry critically examines the degree of responsiveness and behavioral effectiveness exhibited by judges in dealing with and interpreting these extralegal variables. The central objective is to determine whether the procedural trajectory of a capital case—from pretrial investigation and prosecutorial indictment to evidentiary appraisal, conviction, and sentencing—is governed strictly by objective legal elements, or whether it is systematically mediated by the subjective judicial appraisal of the defendant’s social identity.
To examine this inquiry with empirical rigor, the study utilizes a qualitative design combining the content analysis of primary judicial documents with semi-structured elite field interviews. The documentary corpus comprises authentic case dossiers of defendants prosecuted for or sentenced to capital punishment for aggravated narcotics infractions. Through systematic analysis of police apprehension reports, prosecutorial interrogation transcripts, indictments, defense briefs, and the legal reasoning in final verdicts, the research tracks how defendant characteristics are evaluated across procedural milestones. This archival analysis is triangulated with in-depth qualitative interviews conducted with criminal court judges possessing substantial tenure in capital narcotics adjudication, as well as licensed defense attorneys specializing in capital drug litigation. This methodology captures the uncodified institutional norms and discretionary practices that govern judicial outcomes behind formal statutory texts.
The empirical findings demonstrate that the personal characteristics of the accused are decisive variables that actively modulate both the procedural handling and final substantive outcomes of capital narcotics cases. Far from administering a homogenous standard of justice, criminal justice administrators manifest distinct patterns of differential treatment based on the defendant's gender, age, ethnicity, nationality (specifically the presence of foreign nationals), and, in certain regional contexts, religious affiliation. These demographic factors directly alter how judges construct criminal intentionality (*mens rea*) and determine whether to exercise statutory discretion to avert the ultimate sanction.
This discretionary dynamic operates in a polarized manner across the adjudicative spectrum. In cases involving female defendants or youthful offenders with no prior criminal record, these variables frequently lead to a decrease in death sentences and proactive recourse to legal leniency institutions (*nahadha-ye erfaqi*). Influenced by institutional paternalism, judges often view female involvement through the lens of economic dependency, familial coercion, or marital subjugation. Consequently, courts regularly reclassify charges to non-capital roles, apply statutory mitigation, or recommend executive clemency via the Pardon and Leniency Commission. Similarly, when adjudicating young, non-recidivist defendants, judges experience profound ethical reluctance to permanently end young lives with perceived rehabilitative potential, frequently resolving evidentiary doubts in favor of the accused under Islamic jurisprudential principles such as the rule of *Dar’* to substitute capital punishment with custodial terms.
Conversely, the findings reveal an acute asymmetry regarding nationality: in cases involving foreign nationals—most notably Afghan nationals intercepted along eastern transit corridors—judicial hesitation dissolves in favor of strict statutory formalism and an absence of leniency. Deprived of the local kinship networks, social capital, and community mediation channels accessible to domestic citizens, foreign defendants face an adjudicative environment dominated by security concerns and deterrence. Criminal justice administrators tend to view foreign offenders primarily as links in organized transnational syndicates rather than vulnerable individuals, creating substantial barriers to discretionary mitigation, alternative interpretations of intent, or post-conviction clemency.
In conclusion, the study illustrates that judicial hesitation in Iranian capital drug jurisprudence is profoundly contingent. While internal judicial variables foster procedural leniency and charge recharacterization for female and youthful defendants, they harden into unyielding punitive severity when applied to foreign nationals and marginalized demographics, demonstrating that extralegal characteristics fundamentally shape the boundary between life and death in the administration of criminal justice.
Cyber Aggression and the right to Self-Defense against It
Volume 55, Issue 3, Autumn 2026, Pages 3-21
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.392754.1990
shadi tazesh, seyed ghasem zamani, mahdi abdolmaleki
Abstract Technological advancement has undergone a huge transformation in old forms of attack in such a way that various news is heard about the attacks by governmental and non-governmental actors towards the fundamental foundations of another country’s life and not necessarily the tangible borders of that land. Given that many types of modern attacks meet the criteria of aggression and on the other hand in 2010 after years of doubt and speculation states have agreed on the definition of aggression in Kampala and have drawn up an agreement and it is unlikely over the next few decades we can hope for the formation of a document to legalize these attacks one can optimistically believe that the Kampala document has such a capacity to solve the problem of legal vacuum in these years although it is not the final solution. By validating the hypothesis of the realization of aggression in cyber space, self-defense is raised against it by the violated country which can be resolved by resorting to existing rules such as Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Tallinn Guidelines in such a way that cyber-attacks must necessarily fulfill the criteria of the threshold i.e. character, gravity and scale, be consider as an armed attack and be placed within the scope of the concept of force included in the article 2(4) Charter of the United Nations. Legal requirements of self-defense such as ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ should be observed towards off a ‘present’ or ‘imminent’ danger of armed cyber aggression; however, things like the variety of attackers in the cyber space and collision of non-territorial borders can make the issue of self-defense subject to new bumps
Qisas -e nafs in the Cinematic Frame: A Qualitative Study Through the Lens of Cultural Criminology
Volume 55, Issue 3, Autumn 2026, Pages 23-40
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.411676.2073
zahra farhadi alashti
Abstract This article analyzes the cinematic construction of the of Qisas -e nafs in Iranian films produced over the past four decades, through the lens of cultural criminology. To this end, drawing on the anarchist methodology of cultural criminology, David Altheide’s ethnographic content analysis is employed as the main analytical tool. Given the qualitative nature of the study, the sample was selected through non-probability purposive sampling, and ethnographic content analysis was conducted on thirty films. The findings indicate that the meaning of Qisas -e nafs, as a floating signifier, is reproduced across four interpretive spectra depending on narrative logic and representational patterns: legitimation, problematization, substitution, and semantic suspension. Furthermore, some critical filmmakers, by intervening in the meaning-making policies of the dominant discourse, challenge the hegemonic meaning of Qisas -e nafs and seek to destabilize official narratives of an order grounded in Qisas -e nafs. These representations are critically examined at three levels: structural victimization, collateral effects of Qisas -e nafs, and the wrongful convictions.
Islamization of Pakistan's Criminal Legislation in the Light of Political Transformations
Volume 55, Issue 3, Autumn 2026, Pages 41-59
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.402371.2039
فائزه Manteghi
Abstract This article examines the influence of Islamist movements on criminal legislation in Pakistan, with particular emphasis on the political dimensions of criminal law. The central question is how Islamism has shaped the Islamization of criminal law and reconfigured the relationship between the state, Sharia, and society. Adopting a historical-analytical approach and a case study methodology, the study traces the evolution of Pakistan’s criminal justice system from the country’s establishment in 1947 through the Islamization program of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988) to later reforms, particularly the Women’s Protection Act of 2006. The analysis shows that Islamization was not merely an effort to apply Islamic jurisprudence. Facing a legitimacy deficit, Zia presented the implementation of Sharia as both a religious obligation and a source of political legitimacy, introducing the Hudood Ordinances of 1979, the Qisas and Diyat laws, and institutions such as the Federal Shariat Court. Although Islamist actors, notably Jamaat-e-Islami, promoted these measures, the state adopted and applied Islamic norms selectively according to political considerations. Islamization therefore emerged as a negotiated and contested project shaped by the balance of power among state institutions, religious movements, legal elites, and social actors. Criticism from civil society, women’s rights activists, legal professionals, and international human rights bodies, particularly regarding women and religious minorities, prompted later revisions, most notably the 2006 Act, showing that Islamization was neither static nor irreversible. The study concludes that criminal law in Pakistan has become a key arena for redefining the relationship between Sharia, state authority, and political legitimacy.
The Crime of “Baghi” in the Mirror of Safavid History with Reference to the Islamic Penal Code Enacted in 2013
Volume 55, Issue 3, Autumn 2026, Pages 61-79
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.407833.2062
marjan negahi mokhlesabadi
Abstract This article presents a comparative study of the crime of "baghi" during the Safavid era and the Islamic Penal Code of 2013. Using a descriptive-analytical method and drawing upon reliable historical sources including ʿĀlam-ārā-ye ʿAbbāsī, Rawżat al-Ṣafawiyya, Aḥsan al-Tawārīkh, and Jahāngoshā-ye Khāqān as well as the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, this research elucidates the concepts of "baghi" and "bughat", the evolution of the associated legal provisions, and the role of this crime in maintaining social and political order. The central focus of the study is to compare and analyze the concept, instances and penalties associated with "baghi" across these two historical periods, addressing the extent to which the definition and rulings regarding this crime align with Imamia jurisprudence or have undergone transformation. The findings indicate that during the Safavid era, the term "baghi" was primarily used to denote armed insurrection and opponent to the government; Safavid historians sought to legitimize and necessitate the suppression and elimination of dissidents by applying jurisprudential terms such as :baghi" and "taghi" to them. Similarly, the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 classifies "baghi" as a crime against the government, utilizing a comparable definition. Although the jurisprudential roots of the crime have been largely preserved, the nature of the prescribed punishments has changed. This analysis contributes to a better understanding of the challenges and evolutions within Iran’s jurisprudence-based criminal law and clarifies the legal status of the crime of "baghi" within its historical context.
From Childhood Trauma to Adolescent Theft: A Field Study in Alborz Province Correctional Centers
Volume 55, Issue 3, Autumn 2026, Pages 81-101
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.397840.2012
mahdi vahdattaher, hasanali moazenzadegan, hossein gholami don, faramarz sohrabi esmrod
Abstract Adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) are significant developmental risk factors that, in interaction with individual, familial, and social conditions, may increase adolescents’ vulnerability to delinquency. This study examined the relationship between adverse childhood experiences and theft offending and compared these experiences among adolescents who had committed theft and non-delinquent adolescents in Alborz Province, Iran. This quantitative study used a causal-comparative (ex post facto), cross-sectional design. The sample included 62 adolescents aged 15–18 who had committed theft and resided in the Juvenile Correction and Rehabilitation Center of Alborz Province, and 742 non-delinquent adolescents (412 boys and 330 girls). Childhood trauma was assessed using the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ), supplemented by questions on violence against mothers and family dysfunction. Data were analyzed using the non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test. The findings showed that total childhood trauma scores and all dimensions were significantly higher among adolescents who had committed theft than among non-delinquent adolescents (p < .001). The largest difference concerned physical neglect, followed by other forms of maltreatment and neglect. The former group also reported more frequent exposure to violence against their mothers, parental divorce, parental substance abuse, and parental incarceration. These findings suggest that adolescent theft cannot be explained solely by a single risk factor or economic motivation. Rather, cumulative adverse childhood experiences may increase vulnerability to delinquency by undermining parental care and supervision, emotional bonds, and self-regulatory processes. Preventing adolescent theft therefore requires early identification of children exposed to adversity and stronger family-centered interventions and social support.
Conscience, Shame, and Reintegration In Literature and Criminology: A Comparative Reading of Braithwaite’s Theory and the Moral Narratives of Dostoevsky and George Eliot.
Volume 55, Issue 3, Autumn 2026, Pages 103-118
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.408570.2064
Farough Yazdani Azad, Hosain Aghababayi
Abstract In this article, the author adopts an interdisciplinary approach to examine the concepts of conscience, shame, and reintegration at the intersection of John Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming and nineteenth-century literary representations. Through a comparative methodology, the study demonstrates that classical literature - both at the individual level (in the works of Fyodor Dostoevsky) and the social level (in the works of George Eliot) - depicts patterns of shame, moral transformation, and reintegration that structurally overlap with the core components of Braithwaite’s theory. In Dostoevsky’s seminal novel Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov’s trajectory of transformation - from guilt, isolation, and suffering to confession and redemption - constitutes an instance of individual reintegration grounded in inner experience, moral conscience, and reintegrative shame. Although this model operates on a more limited social scale, it remains comparable to the psychological dimensions of Braithwaite’s theory. Conversely, in Adam Bede, George Eliot constructs reintegration within a social framework shaped by communal empathy and the society’s ethical bonds - a structure that more closely parallels the socially oriented dimension of Braithwaite’s model. The study’s findings indicate that literature not only presents mechanisms of reintegration predating the formal articulation of reintegrative shaming theory, but also, through deeper exploration of human ethical and lived experience, offers a multilayered and more humanized understanding of the process by which an offender returns to the community.
Narrative Criminology: Analytical Possibilities and Explanatory Limitations (An Immanent Critique)
Volume 55, Issue 2, Spring 2025, Pages 3-22
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.414186.2081
farhad Allahverdi meygouni
Abstract Narrative criminology has emerged over the past two decades as a dynamic theoretical approach within the study of crime and deviance. In contrast to mainstream criminology, which has traditionally understood criminal action as the product of variables such as economic deprivation, personality disorder, or institutional dysfunction, narrative criminology shifts the analytical focus to the constitutive, directive, and justificatory power of stories. From this perspective, individuals do not commit crime simply because they possess a particular attribute; rather, they act within and through the narratives that lend coherence, direction, and legitimacy to their lives. The approach is a legitimate product of the broader "narrative turn" in the humanities and social sciences—an intellectual current with roots in poststructuralism and critical theories of language, which proposes that human experience is not accessed directly, but is shaped, represented, and transmitted through narrative structures. It is crucial to note that this emphasis on narrative should not be narrowly interpreted as a focus solely on the oral accounts of offenders; the approach recognizes a wide range of narrative sources, including victims' accounts, official documents, oral histories, media texts, and broader cultural narratives embedded in literature, film, and political discourse.
Despite its rapid growth over the past decade, narrative criminology continues to face pressing questions regarding its theoretical status. A distinct research gap is evident in the literature, which can be summarized along three axes. First, existing studies have largely either explicated the approach's capacities or critiqued it from external perspectives, such as those of positivist or structuralist traditions; an evaluation based on its own stated criteria—an immanent critique—is rarely undertaken. Second, theoretical discussions have paid insufficient attention to recurrent misconceptions about the approach, which inadvertently recall the very positivist foundations it promised to transcend. Third, while there is general acknowledgment of the approach's limitations, these have rarely been subjected to systematic formulation. This article addresses these gaps by asking whether narrative criminology has genuinely moved beyond the prevailing assumptions of mainstream criminology, or has merely reproduced classical concepts in new language.
The article proceeds in three interconnected analytical steps. The first reconstructs the theoretical orientation and conceptual apparatus of narrative criminology. Drawing on modern narratology, narrative is defined as the meaningful organization of events through two fundamental elements: story (the set of narrated events) and plot (the causal and meaningful relations among these events). In the criminological context, this organization foregrounds three core analytical dimensions: narrative causality, which addresses how narrative provides a meaningful context within which harmful action becomes comprehensible and justified; characterization of offender and victim, rooted in Goffman's dramaturgical approach, which involves the distribution of moral positions—who is cast as hero, victim, or villain—and is never neutral, always linked to the allocation of responsibility; and narrative identity, which explores how self-stories justify past action and set the stage for future conduct, while recognizing that offender self-narratives are often not coherent and unified, but multidimensional, fragmented, and marked by "narrative hot spots" where tensions become apparent.
The second step identifies and critiques three fundamental misconceptions that undermine the approach's critical potential. The first is its reduction to mere storytelling, which ignores the approach's analytical engagement with narrative discourse—how events are organized into meaning—rather than the raw content of the story. The second is its reduction to a research method, such as narrative interviewing, which overlooks the crucial epistemological distinction between narrative as a data-collection tool and narrative as a paradigm. The third, relatedly, is the treatment of narrative as a tool for discovering an objective, positivist "truth," rather than focusing on what Sandberg (2010) terms narrative truth, where the analytical value lies in the identity-constructing and performative functions of storytelling, even when it involves deception.
The third and most substantial step turns to the internal tensions that arise from the approach's own logic. The first and most fundamental is narrative silence, formulated on two distinct but intertwined levels. One is traumatic silence: the narrator's inability to articulate experience due to the severity of psychological harm. This is not a simple absence but an active, socially-constructed space where usual linguistic frameworks break down, posing a profound methodological paradox—narrative criminology needs narrative to understand its effects, yet narrative fails precisely where the most damaging experiences are located. This "narrative pause" at critical moments is not limited to victims; studies of violent offenders show a similar narrative breakdown when describing the moment of violence itself. The second level concerns the non-discursive: language's own incapacity to fully represent dimensions of experience—embodied habits, pre-linguistic affects, practical skills, automatic reactions—that are thoroughly real and consequential yet resist narrativization. This challenge is especially acute in two areas: violence and incarceration. The concept of "carceral habitus" (Page & Goodmann, 2020) illustrates how the embodied, habitual dimensions of prison experience cannot be fully captured through inmate interviews alone.
The second internal tension is the politics of narrative, concerning the approach's relationship with power. This operates at two complementary levels. At the pre-narrative level, unequal power relations determine whose narrative is heard and whose remains unheard—a structural silencing that raises the ethical question of whether narrative criminology should actively seek to restore voice to the marginalized. At the post-narrative level, narratives are always produced within specific "discursive orders" shaped by criminal justice institutions, media, and the academy itself, and are perpetually susceptible to appropriation by more powerful institutions. Against the danger of "narrative voyeurism"—consuming stories of suffering for academic pleasure without ethical commitment—the article argues for a reflexive narrative approach that accepts the "responsibility of witnessing": a committed presence in the face of the other's narrative, with critical empathy and constant awareness of the researcher's own position within circuits of power.
The central argument of the article is that the tension between narrative and its non-discursive remainders—traumatic silence, embodied habits, structurally imposed silences—is not an epistemological flaw, but the very condition of possibility for narrative criminology itself. If everything were reducible to narrative, the approach would risk collapsing into a tautology: "narrative constructs crime and we analyze narrative." The way out of this impasse is to acknowledge precisely those things that escape narrative. Taking these tensions seriously does not require negating the approach, but rather delimiting its claims and re-theorizing its status. Narrative criminology remains faithful to its theoretical promise only when it abandons totalizing ambitions and redefines itself as a "boundary-conscious analytical lens"—a lens whose value lies not in eliminating what lies outside narrative, but in illuminating the dynamic relationship between the narrative and those remainders that refuse to be fully narrated. This redefinition carries a practical corollary: the narrative criminological researcher must adopt a reflexive orientation, aware of their own position of power, and committed to situated, partial explanations of crime stories, with sensitivity to power as an internal logic of analysis rather than an external appendix.
Keywords: narrative criminology, narrative turn, crime stories, narrative causality, narrative silence, politics of narrative.
Victimology Men Constructing Sexual Offending Against Men: A Qualitative Analysis of Male Sexual Victimization
Volume 55, Issue 1, Spring 2025, Pages 26-3
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.393969.2010
Aref Esmailzadeh, Ali Saffary
Abstract Male sexual victimization, despite its significant psychological, social and legal importance, is considered one of the less-researched topics in criminological and psychological literature. This study was conducted with the aim of identifying the complex dimensions of this phenomenon and analyzing its psychological, social and legal consequences. The main question of the article is based on how the experience of sexual victimization affects men and what patterns of offending can be identified in this area. The research method is designed as mixed (qualitative–theoretical) and qualitative data were collected through in-depth interviews with experts and victims, using the Delphi method and snowball sampling and analyzed with MAXQDA software. The findings show that gender stereotypes and patriarchal norms make it difficult for men to report victimization, leading to social isolation, anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorders in victims. Perpetrators have been classified into situational, dominant, vengeful, psychopathic and organized types and women have also been categorized in exploitative positions. The results emphasize the necessity of revising criminal policies and creating specialized support mechanisms for male victims and demonstrate that changing cultural attitudes and raising public awareness play a fundamental role in improving the situation of this vulnerable group.
Criminal Protection of Commercial Trust: An Analysis of the Offence of Non-Disclosure of Conflict of Interest by a Broker
Volume 55, Issue 2, Spring 2025, Pages 67-84
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.403584.2046
Ahmad Rahimi, Mohammad Ebrahim Shams Natri, Hassan Aalipour, Alireza Aalipanah
Abstract Abstract
This study employs a descriptive–analytical method and library-based sources to examine the criminal protection of commercial trust through an analysis of the offence of non-disclosure of a broker’s conflict of interest under Article 346 of the Commercial Code, with reference to Article 54 of the 2024 Draft Commercial Code. It seeks to clarify the protected legal interest and the conditions governing criminal liability. The findings demonstrate that the protected value is commercial trust and the preservation of the broker’s financial impartiality. Commercial trust is conceived not merely as the personal confidence of one contracting party, but as an institutional foundation of intermediary market relations, the impairment of which may undermine the integrity and efficiency of commercial transactions. The criminal conduct consists of an omission-failure to disclose a benefit or share to an uninformed party. Accordingly, neither criminal fraud nor actual harm is required; the offence is therefore classified as a formal (conduct-based) crime. However, liability requires the broker’s knowledge of the relevant benefit or share and intentional concealment (general intent). Criminal responsibility arises upon the conclusion of a valid and legally effective transaction. Although the exclusion of punishment where the transaction fails or is declared void accords with the principles of strict interpretation and minimal criminal intervention, it may weaken deterrence and encourage risk-taking behavior regarding the duty of disclosure
An analysis of the foundations and manifestations of minimalism in Iranian law with a look at the law of the United States of America
Volume 55, Issue 2, Spring 2025, Pages 85-105
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2025.396424.2005
adnan omrani far
Abstract The penal minimalist approach, as one of the new developments in penal policies, emphasizes reducing the use of prison sentences and replacing them with corrective and preventive measures. This research aims to examine the foundations of the tendency towards penal minimalism in the Penal Reduction Law approved in 2020 and compare it with the American legal system. The research findings show that the tendency towards penal minimalistism is rooted in criminological perspectives such as social disability theories, criminal psychology, restorative and Marxist justice, which emphasize the ineffectiveness of prison in reforming criminals and increasing the cycle of crime. From the perspective of criminal law, the reformability of criminals, reducing economic costs, proportionality of punishment, protection of human rights, and the inefficiency of the prison system are among the foundations of this approach. In the American penal system, especially after the enactment of the Prisoner Recidivism Reduction Act (2018), minimalist policies have been pursued with a focus on reducing prison terms, improving prison conditions, implementing correctional and rehabilitation programs, and reducing socio-economic inequalities in the administration of justice. In comparison to the United States, Iranian penal reforms have mainly focused on reducing custodial sentences and developing leniency institutions. The present study, which was developed using a descriptive-analytical method, shows that penal minimalism can help reduce the prison population, reduce
The Position of Judges' Fault and Negligence in Claiming Damages: A Case Study of Selected Public Fund Cases
Volume 55, Issue 2, Spring 2025, Pages 106-122
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.400900.2028
mahdieh vojdani fakhr, razieh saberi, ali farhadi
Abstract Judicial immunity has been recognized in many legal systems as a safeguard to ensure judicial independence and impartial adjudication. However, in certain circumstances, judicial decisions may result in material or moral harm to litigants, thereby conflicting with the principle of fair trial. This article examines the legal process and judicial practice governing claims for damages arising from judges’ fault and negligence before the High Disciplinary Court for Judges, with a particular focus on selected cases involving public funds. Employing a descriptive–analytical methodology based on documentary research, the study demonstrates that, notwithstanding the establishment of manifest fault in some cases, the High Disciplinary Court often reclassifies such conduct as “negligence” and consequently obliges the Public Fund to bear compensation. Moreover, the absence of the Ministry of Justice in the adjudicatory process increases the risk of conflicts of interest, while inadequate judicial awareness may amount to legal “fault.” The findings underscore the necessity of a more precise judicial distinction between fault and negligence, reforms in adjudicatory procedures, and the enhancement of judicial competence.
The nature of error in purpose from the perspective of the foundations of criminal law; with a view to the penal system of England and Wales
Volume 55, Issue 1, Spring 2025, Pages 110-97
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2026.387818.1965
abbas mohammadkhani, Amir Etemadi
Abstract In the present article, which is written in a descriptive analytical method, the legal nature of the mistake in purpose in criminal law is investigated. The result of the present research is that a mistake in the goal will not lead to the realization of intentional crimes. Because the malice of a person belongs either to a specific subject or to many unspecified subjects, unlike the latter case where there are as many malice due to the malice belonging to indefinite subjects, the perpetrator's malice in the first case is limited and exclusive in one or several subjects, and therefore, With the "collision" or "non-collision" of the behavior with the object in question, its life ends, and if the behavior hits another object, there is no malice that can be used to consider the recent incident as intentional. Also, there are two types of mistakes in purpose. A state in which only the unintended subject is harmed, and a state in which, in addition to the intended subject, the unintended subject is also harmed. In the second case of a mistake in purpose, in which the perpetrator's behavior affects another subject in addition to the intended subject, it cannot be said that because he intended to commit a crime on one subject, if the perpetrator's behavior also affects any other subject, there is also a intention towards it; Which shows that the mistake in purpose is not intentional.
Validation of Witness Testimony Hearing in the Context of Modern Technologies; Challenges and Opportunities
Volume 55, Issue 1, Spring 2025, Pages 141-111
https://doi.org/10.22059/jqclcs.2025.387090.1963
Hasanali Moazenzadegan, Nasrin Mehra, Morteza Rasteh
Abstract In-person testimony in court holds a prominent position among the means of proof in criminal proceedings. However, in light of the growing advancements in technology and ongoing digital transformation, the use of modern technological platforms for taking or receiving witness testimony has emerged as a complex and controversial issue in criminal law. Despite the partial recognition of certain forms of remote testimony in existing criminal statutes, its legal validity as a primary evidentiary method in judicial proceedings remains uncertain. Accordingly, the present study—using a descriptive–analytical approach—aims to assess the evidentiary credibility and normative legitimacy of technologically enabled witness testimony. It explores the key advantages and challenges of this method and examines the legal and procedural conditions necessary for its admissibility. The findings of the research suggest that receiving testimony through digital means may offer benefits such as enhanced protection for witnesses in certain sensitive categories of offences, increased procedural efficiency, and reduced costs accompanied by improved data retention. Nonetheless, this method raises serious concerns, including the erosion of the role of in-court testimony, the potential infringement of the defendant’s right to a face-to-face and adversarial hearing, and limitations arising from courtroom logistics and technical infrastructure. Despite these concerns, the negative impacts may be mitigated by formulating coherent legal policies and strict adherence to procedural and technological safeguards. Ultimately, the study concludes that technologically facilitated testimony—where certain conditions, such as the impossibility of the witness’s physical attendance and the reliable attribution of the testimony to the witness, are satisfied—enjoys legal legitimacy and may be admitted as valid evidence in criminal proceedings.